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| Jaffe, Judson; Stavins, Robert N.. |
| Cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred national and regional instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism — an international emission-reduction-credit system — has developed a substantial constituency, despite some concerns about its performance. Because linkage between tradable permit systems can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems to each other, as well as to the CDM and other credit systems. We examine the benefits and concerns associated with various types of linkages, and analyze the near-term and long-term role that linkage may play in a future international climate policy... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Linkage; Cap-and-Trade; Tradable Permits; Global Climate Change; Environmental Economics and Policy; F500; Q200; Q400; Q500. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46624 |
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| Hahn, Robert W.; Stavins, Robert N.. |
| We examine an implication of the “Coase Theorem” which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is very important because it allows equity and efficiency concerns to be separated in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, the property means that the government can establish the overall... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cap-and-Trade System; Tradable Permits; Coase Theorem; Allowance Allocation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q580; H110; L510. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92707 |
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| Antoniou, Fabio; Hatzipanayotou, Panos; Koundouri, Phoebe. |
| In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strategic Environmental Policy; Tradable Permits; Race to the top; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q58; F12; F18. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59374 |
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