| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism
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| Autores: |
Mullen, Jeffrey D.
Centner, Terence J.
Wetzstein, Michael E.
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| Data: |
2007-07-02
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| Ano: |
2007
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| Palavras-chave: |
Command and control
Environmental education
Environmental policy
Voluntary agreements
Environmental Economics and Policy
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| Resumo: |
Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging. As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone. Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities. Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not. The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and voluntary agreements. With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and economic goals.
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| Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
26020
http://purl.umn.edu/9357
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
American Agricultural Economics Association>2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon
Selected Paper #171391
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| Formato: |
29
application/pdf
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