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Provedor de dados:  AgEcon
País:  United States
Título:  The Value of Private Risk Versus the Value of Public Risk: An Experimental Analysis of the Johannesson et al. Conjecture
Autores:  Messer, Kent D.
Poe, Gregory L.
Schulze, William D.
Data:  2008-08-10
Ano:  2008
Palavras-chave:  Altruism
Risk
Voting
Public goods
Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
Risk and Uncertainty
D81
D64
H41
C91
C92
D72
Resumo:  In 1996 Johannesson et al. published a paper in this journal entitled “The Value of Private Safety versus the Value of Public Safety.” Based on preliminary evidence from a hypothetical contingent valuation study, these authors argue that consumers behave as “pure altruists” and reject the notion of paternalistic preferences for safety in a coercive tax setting. These pure altruists consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they decide whether to vote for or against public safety programs. The authors conclude that further empirical research in this area is warranted. This paper presents a set of laboratory economics experiments to test Johannesson et al.’s conjecture under controlled conditions in which participants face an actual risk of financial loss. The laboratory results extend those of Johannesson et al., providing strong evidence of pure altruism but limited support for paternalistic altruism for risk.
Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma:  Inglês
Identificador:  http://purl.umn.edu/51141
Relação:  Cornell University>Department of Applied Economics and Management>Working Papers
Working Paper
WP 2008-13
Formato:  40
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