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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (19) Autor Ancev, Tihomir (2) Betz, Regina (2) Gerlagh, Reyer (2) Kverndokk, Snorre (2) Rosendahl, Knut Einar (2) Sanderson, Todd (2) Xepapadeas, Anastasios (2) Bosetti, Valentina (1) Canton, Joan (1) Carraro, Carlo (1) Ciaschini, Maurizio (1) David, Maia (1) Duval, Romain (1) Folmer, Henk (1) Iafolla, Valentina (1) Ikefuji, Masako (1) Itaya, Jun-ichi (1) Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia (1) Lapatinas, Athanasios (1) Lescot, Jean-Marie (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Policy (19) Environmental Economics and Policy (11) H23 (4) Q43 (4) Q58 (4) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (4) Climate Change (3) H2 (3) Patents (3) Technological Change (3) Crop Production/Industries (2) Emissions Trading Scheme (2) H21 (2) H3 (2) Innovation (2) O30 (2) O34 (2) Q42 (2) Q48 (2) Q55 (2) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (15) Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Journal Article (1) Report (1) Ano 2011 (3) 2010 (6) 2009 (4) 2008 (4) 2007 (2) País United States (19) Idioma Inglês (19)		Registro completo Provedor de dados:  AgEcon País:  United States Título:  Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements? Autores:  von Mouche, Pierre Folmer, Henk Data:  2007-06-27 Ano:  2007 Palavras-chave:  Environmental Policy Linking Folk Theorem Tensor Game Prsioners Full Cooperation Pareto Efficiency Minkowski Sum Vector Maximum Convex Analysis Research Methods/ Statistical Methods C72 Resumo:  Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries. Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper Idioma:  Inglês Identificador:  26588 http://purl.umn.edu/9557 Editor:  AgEcon Search Relação:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers ETA Nota di Lavoro 60.2007 Formato:  19 application/pdf Fechar

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