| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION
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| Autores: |
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.
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| Data: |
1998-04-29
|
| Ano: |
1995
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Environmental
Regulation
Tax
Dynamic
Game
Environmental Economics and Policy
Q25
H32
D62
|
| Resumo: |
I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
617
http://purl.umn.edu/28351
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
Utah State University>Economics Department>Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers
ERI Study Paper 95-29
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| Formato: |
29
application/pdf
|
