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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (78) Autor Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto (9) Richards, Timothy J. (6) Stiegert, Kyle W. (5) Chavas, Jean-Paul (3) Hovhannisyan, Vardges (3) Karp, Larry S. (3) Lavoie, Nathalie (3) Lopez, Rigoberto A. (3) Perloff, Jeffrey M. (3) Shi, Guanming (3) Acharya, Ram N. (2) Bonanno, Alessandro (2) Bonnet, Céline (2) Brown, Jennifer (2) Chambolle, Claire (2) Dubois, Pierre (2) Hamilton, Stephen F. (2) Hastings, Justine (2) Innes, Robert (2) Mansur, Erin T. (2) Mais... Palavra-chave L13 (78) Industrial Organization (28) Agribusiness (17) D43 (17) Demand and Price Analysis (17) Market power (15) Marketing (13) Q13 (13) Agricultural and Food Policy (11) Environmental Economics and Policy (10) International Relations/Trade (9) L66 (7) L81 (7) Oligopoly (7) Crop Production/Industries (6) F12 (6) L11 (6) Consumer/Household Economics (5) F13 (5) Financial Economics (5) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (34) Working or Discussion Paper (25) Journal Article (14) Working Paper (5) Ano 2011 (11) 2010 (15) 2009 (13) 2008 (6) 2007 (8) 2006 (5) 2005 (8) 2004 (2) 2002 (3) 2001 (3) 1999 (1) 1997 (1) 1996 (2) Mais... País United States (78) Idioma Inglês (77) Português (1)		Registro completo Provedor de dados:  AgEcon País:  United States Título:  Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions Autores:  Davis, David E. Data:  2012-05-24 Ano:  2011 Palavras-chave:  Auctions Food assistance Countervailing power Buyer concentration Oligopoly WIC. Consumer/Household Economics Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety Industrial Organization L13 D43 D44 Q18 I18 Resumo:  State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus. Tipo:  Working Paper Idioma:  Inglês Identificador:  http://purl.umn.edu/123863 Relação:  Agricultural and Applied Economics Association>2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington Formato:  27 Fechar

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