| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Efficiency under a Combination of Ordinal and Cardinal Information on Preferences
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| Autores: |
Athanassoglou, Stergios
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| Data: |
2011-03-08
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| Ano: |
2011
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| Palavras-chave: |
Random Assignment
Efficiency
Duality
Linear Programming
Environmental Economics and Policy
C61
D01
D60
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| Resumo: |
Replaced with a revised version of paper 10/05/11.
Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m ≥ n. Each agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of “plausible” benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions in whose non-negative span his “true” utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation, we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is ex-ante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preference-compatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/101288
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| Relação: |
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Sustainable Development Papers
SD
11.2011
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| Formato: |
14
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