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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (41) Autor Burtraw, Dallas (7) Betz, Regina (5) Palmer, Karen L. (5) Kerr, Suzi (4) Bharvirkar, Ranjit (3) Fischer, Carolyn (3) Jotzo, Frank (3) Kruger, Joseph (3) Boom, Jan Tjeerd (2) Fowlie, Meredith (2) Grainger, Corinne (2) Kahn, Danny (2) Murphy, James J. (2) Paul, Anthony (2) Perloff, Jeffrey M. (2) Quiggin, John C. (2) Restiani, Phillia (2) Ribaudo, Marc (2) Spraggon, John M. (2) Stranlund, John K. (2) Mais... Palavra-chave Emissions trading (41) Environmental Economics and Policy (38) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (10) Q2 (8) Climate change (7) Electricity (7) Q4 (7) Nitrogen oxides (6) Q25 (6) Air pollution (5) Compliance (5) Particulates (5) Q28 (5) Q58 (5) Greenhouse gases (4) Health benefits (4) L51 (4) Public Economics (4) Q53 (4) Abatement (3) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (21) Conference Paper or Presentation (10) Report (8) Journal Article (2) Ano 2010 (6) 2009 (8) 2008 (7) 2007 (2) 2005 (4) 2004 (4) 2003 (5) 2002 (1) 2001 (3) 1998 (1) Mais... País United States (41) Idioma Inglês (40) Alemão (1)		Registro completo Provedor de dados:  AgEcon País:  United States Título:  An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets Autores:  Stranlund, John K. Murphy, James J. Spraggon, John M. Data:  2010-09-20 Ano:  2010 Palavras-chave:  Compliance Enforcement Emissions trading Laboratory experiments Permit markets Permit banking Environmental Economics and Policy Public Economics C91 L51 Q58 Resumo:  Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions. Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper Idioma:  Inglês Identificador:  http://purl.umn.edu/93966 Relação:  University of Massachusetts, Amherst>Department of Resource Economics>Working Paper Series Working Paper 2010-3 Formato:  44 Fechar

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