| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?
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| Autores: |
Schilizzi, Steven
Breustedt, Gunnar
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe
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| Data: |
2011-02-18
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| Ano: |
2011
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| Palavras-chave: |
Conservation tenders
Auctions
Incentive contracts
Agricultural policy
Environmental policy
Market-based instruments
Experimental economics
Environmental Economics and Policy
Land Economics/Use
C92
D44
D82
D86
H57
Q24
Q28
|
| Resumo: |
Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results suggest that it can be counterproductive in terms of expected environmental outcomes to combine tenders with incentive payments, especially when the target population is known to be risk-averse.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/100883
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| Relação: |
University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Working Papers
Working Paper
1102
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| Formato: |
39
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