| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT
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| Autores: |
Bystrom, Olof
Bromley, Daniel W.
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| Data: |
1997-05-14
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| Ano: |
1996
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| Palavras-chave: |
Environmental Economics and Policy
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| Resumo: |
This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
33
http://purl.umn.edu/12620
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
University of Wisconsin-Madison>Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics>Staff Papers
Staff Paper 392
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| Formato: |
31
application/pdf
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