| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
|
| Título: |
CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND EXCESSIVE NITROGEN USE IN AGRICULTURE
|
| Autores: |
Preckel, Paul V.
Shively, Gerald E.
Baker, Timothy G.
Chu, Mei-Chin
Burrell, Jessica Eide
|
| Data: |
2004-01-05
|
| Ano: |
2000
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Crop Production/Industries
|
| Resumo: |
This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.
|
| Tipo: |
Journal Article
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
12093
http://purl.umn.edu/30902
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 25, Number 02, December 2000
|
| Formato: |
17
application/pdf
|
|
