| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages
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| Autores: |
Lee, Myoungki
Wu, Steven Y.
Fan, Maoyong
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| Data: |
2008-08-20
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| Ano: |
2008
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| Palavras-chave: |
Contract law
Contract regulation
Damages
Incentives
Principal-agent
Farm Management
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| Resumo: |
This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease.
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| Tipo: |
Journal Article
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/42461
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| Relação: |
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics> Volume 33, Number 2, August 2008
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| Formato: |
15
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