| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?
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| Autores: |
Bond, Philip
Pande, Rohini
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| Data: |
2006-01-26
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| Ano: |
2005
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| Palavras-chave: |
Coordination
Public policy
Income taxation
Implementation
International Development
O21
H23
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| Resumo: |
Individuals inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individuals incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the governments knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a governments ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
19595
http://purl.umn.edu/28436
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
Yale University>Economic Growth Center>Center Discussion Papers
Center Discussion Paper No. 924
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| Formato: |
38
application/pdf
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