Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (28) Autor Karp, Larry S. (3) Bayer, Patrick (2) Bosetti, Valentina (2) Cardenas, Juan-Camilo (2) Carraro, Carlo (2) Duval, Romain (2) Good, Darrel L. (2) Irwin, Scott H. (2) Jackson, Thomas E. (2) Kopp, Raymond J. (2) Tavoni, Massimo (2) Ahlheim, Michael (1) Aisbett, Emma (1) Alston, Julian M. (1) Bertacchini, Enrico (1) Brunke, Henrich (1) Calatrava-Requena, Javier (1) Carmona-Torres, Carmen (1) Carson, Richard T. (1) Conaway, Michael (1) Mais... Palavra-chave H4 (28) Environmental Economics and Policy (12) Q2 (7) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (6) Q54 (5) Contingent valuation (4) H0 (4) H3 (4) Labor and Human Capital (4) Q1 (4) Community/Rural/Urban Development (3) D6 (3) D8 (3) Public Economics (3) Q5 (3) Q51 (3) Z1 (3) C72 (2) C9 (2) Collective Action (2) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (16) Conference Paper or Presentation (9) Journal Article (2) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2010 (3) 2009 (6) 2008 (1) 2007 (2) 2006 (7) 2003 (2) 1998 (2) 1997 (3) 1996 (1) Mais... País United States (28) Idioma Inglês (27) Espanhol (1)		Registro completo Provedor de dados:  AgEcon País:  United States Título:  International Environmental Agreements: Emissions trade, safety valves and escape clauses Autores:  Karp, Larry S. Zhao, Jinhua Data:  2009-05-22 Ano:  2009 Palavras-chave:  Kyoto Protocol Escape clause Emissions trade Cost uncertainty Participation game International Environmental Agreement Environmental Economics and Policy Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Risk and Uncertainty C72 H4 Q54 Resumo:  We explain how the structure of multi-national or multi-regional environmental agreements affect their chance of success. Trade in emissions permits has ambiguous and in some cases surprising effects on both the equilibrium level of abatement, and on the ability to persuade nations or regions to participate in environmental agreements. An escape clause policy and a safety valve policy have essentially the same properties when membership in environmental agreement is pre-determined, but they create markedly different effects on the incentives to join such an agreement. The two policies lead to a qualitative difference in the leverage that a potential member of the agreement exercises on other members. Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper Idioma:  Inglês Identificador:  http://purl.umn.edu/51611 Relação:  University of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers CUDARE Working Papers 1084 Formato:  30 Fechar

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco