| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
|
| Título: |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CATTLE AUCTIONS: THE PROBLEM OF REVACCINATIONS
|
| Autores: |
Chymis, Athanasios G.
James, Harvey S., Jr.
Konduru, Srinivasa
Pierce, Vern L.
|
| Data: |
2004-07-22
|
| Ano: |
2004
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Livestock Production/Industries
Marketing
|
| Resumo: |
The paper analyzes the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in cattle auctions. An illustration is made regarding the vaccinations that the animals receive. Buyers do not know and cannot verify if sellers have vaccinated their animals forcing them to consider revaccination. Revaccination is only a part of the broader problem of information asymmetry that includes other quality issues and costs that can be saved, thereby increasing the welfare of both buyers and sellers. Structural characteristics of ranching, traditions and consumers' preferences are taken into account and a wider approach is attempted to explain the persistence of the problem in light of potential institutional solutions. We argue for a comprehensive empirical study of the incidence and impacts of buyer revaccination.
|
| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
14740
http://purl.umn.edu/26039
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
University of Missouri - Columbia>Department of Agricultural Economics>Working Papers
Department of Agricultural Economics Working Paper no. 2004-5
|
| Formato: |
29
application/pdf
|
