| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
|
| Título: |
CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT
|
| Autores: |
Bystrom, Olof
Bromley, Daniel W.
|
| Data: |
2003-12-17
|
| Ano: |
1998
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Environmental Economics and Policy
|
| Resumo: |
This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.
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| Tipo: |
Journal Article
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
11399
http://purl.umn.edu/31176
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 23, Number 01, July 1998
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| Formato: |
19
application/pdf
|
