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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (31) ArchiMer (1) Autor Richards, Timothy J. (3) Glebe, Thilo W. (2) Hirschauer, Norbert (2) Nganje, William E. (2) Tisdell, Clement A. (2) Wilson, William W. (2) Acharya, Ram N. (1) Beard, Rodney (1) Besarria, Cassio da Nobrega (1) Brandes, Wilhelm (1) Chen, Jia-Wei (1) Cisse, Abdoul (1) Davidova, Sophia (1) Farias, Christiano Alves (1) Fontaine, Damien (1) Frahan, Bruno Henry de (1) Gaspart, Frederic (1) Gu, Kaiping (1) Hammoudi, Abdelhakim (1) Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Game theory (32) International Relations/Trade (5) Agribusiness (4) Environmental Economics and Policy (4) Agricultural and Food Policy (3) Crop Production/Industries (3) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (3) A13 (2) Asymmetric information (2) China (2) Conservation campaigns (2) Conservation funding (2) Conservation status (2) Control theories (2) Demand and Price Analysis (2) Equilibrium (2) European Union (2) F11 (2) Flagship species (2) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (2) Mais... Tipo do documento Journal Article (11) Working or Discussion Paper (10) Conference Paper or Presentation (8) Report (1) Text (1) Thesis or Dissertation (1) Mais... Ano 2013 (1) 2010 (4) 2009 (4) 2008 (2) 2007 (5) 2006 (4) 2005 (4) 2004 (4) 2001 (2) 1991 (1) 1990 (1) Mais... País United States (31) France (1) Idioma Inglês (27) Português (3) Alemão (1) Francês (1)		Registro completo Provedor de dados:  AgEcon País:  United States Título:  Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality Autores:  Beard, Rodney Mallawaarachchi, Thilak Salerno, Gillian Data:  2007-04-11 Ano:  2007 Palavras-chave:  Game theory Public choice Imperfect public monitoring Imperfect private monitoring Non-point source pollution Agricultural extension Public education Environmental Economics and Policy Resumo:  In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted. Tipo:  Conference Paper or Presentation Idioma:  Inglês Identificador:  25655 http://purl.umn.edu/10391 Editor:  AgEcon Search Relação:  Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - 2007>2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand Conference Paper Formato:  32 application/pdf Fechar

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