| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Making a market for Miscanthus: Can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem?
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| Autores: |
Wu, Steven Y.
Rosch, Stephanie D.
Alexander, Corinne E.
Tyner, Wallace E.
Yoder, Joshua
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| Data: |
2010-05-05
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| Ano: |
2010
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| Palavras-chave: |
Biofuels
Miscanthus
Contract theory
Industrial organization
Renegotiation-proof contract
Marketing
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| Resumo: |
We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof and ex-post efficient. Provided long-run land prices are stationary, the expected cost for both contracts converges to the long-run expected price of land for a risk-neutral farmer.
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| Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/61743
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| Relação: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association>2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado
Selected Poster
11638
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| Formato: |
2
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