| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Creating Incentives for Micro-Credit Agents to Lend to the Poor
|
| Autores: |
Aubert, Cecile
de Janvry, Alain
Sadoulet, Elisabeth
|
| Data: |
2006-02-06
|
| Ano: |
2004
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Micro-credit
Pro-poor
Objectives
Incentives
Financial Economics
Food Security and Poverty
O16
D82
L31.
|
| Resumo: |
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have introduced incentive pay schemes for their credit agents to induce information acquisition on borrowers. Bonuses linked to repayment are efficient for profit-oriented MFIs but insufficient for nonprofit MFIs trying to reach very poor borrowers, when repayment and wealth are positively correlated. We show that no incentive scheme is consistent with this (non-verifiable) objective: Random audits on the share of very poor borrowers selected by the agent become necessary. Under the optimal contract, non-profit MFIs generally maximize the number of poor borrowers it services by crosssubsidization between very poor and less poor borrowers.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
19771
http://purl.umn.edu/25024
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
University of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers
CUDARE Working Paper 988
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| Formato: |
36
application/pdf
|
