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Registros recuperados: 47
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Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games Ecology and Society
Janssen, Marco A; Arizona State University; Marco.Janssen@asu.edu; Ahn, T. K.; Florida State University and Korea University; tahn@fsu.edu.
This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of others and are belief learners. Despite these interesting findings, we conclude that a powerful method of model selection of agent-based models on dynamic social dilemma experiments is still lacking.
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports Palavras-chave: Laboratory experiments; Public goods; Agent-based model; Learning; Social preferences.
Ano: 2006
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Sharing as risk pooling in a social dilemma experiment Ecology and Society
Cherry, Todd L.; Appalachian State University; Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO); cherrytl@appstate.edu; Howe, E. Lance; University of Alaska Anchorage; elhowe@uaa.alaska.edu; Murphy, James J.; University of Alaska Anchorage; Nankai University; Chapman University; murphy@uaa.alaska.edu.
In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. We describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We tested whether risk could be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk pooling induced greater cooperation in the social dilemma. We found that even in the absence of a commitment...
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed article Palavras-chave: Collective action; Experimental economics; Idiosyncratic risk; Income smoothing; Insurance; Lab experiment; Public goods; Resource sharing; Risk pooling; Social dilemma; Social-ecological systems; Team production.
Ano: 2015
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Voluntary disclosure of contributions: an experimental study on nonmandatory approaches for improving public good provision Ecology and Society
Kreitmair, Ursula W.; Indiana University; ukreitma@indiana.edu.
There has been an increasing interest in nonpecuniary measures to encourage prosocial behavior. Among these is the use of social comparison, or social information. Although successful in promoting, for instance, greater resource conservation, studies of this measure have so far relied on the assumption of the availability of social information. In situations in which information is costly to collect and disseminate, alternative mechanisms must be considered. This study explores the use of voluntary disclosure to provide social information in a linear public goods game in a lab experiment. It finds that individuals tend to disclose their contribution information when given the option, suggesting that voluntarily disclosed social information remains a...
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports Palavras-chave: Behavioral information; Cooperation; Experiment; Public goods; Social comparison; Social information; Social norms; Voluntary disclosure.
Ano: 2015
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Advancing the understanding of behavior in social-ecological systems: results from lab and field experiments Ecology and Society
Janssen, Marco A; Arizona State University; Marco.Janssen@asu.edu; Lindahl, Therese; Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Science; Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University; therese.lindahl@beijer.kva.se; Murphy, James J; Nankai University; University of Alaska Anchorage; Chapman University; murphy@uaa.alaska.edu.
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Synthesis Palavras-chave: Behavioral economics; Common-pool resources; Experimental economics; Public goods; Social-ecological systems.
Ano: 2015
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VOLUNTARY REVELATION OF THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC GOODS USING A PROVISION POINT MECHANISM AgEcon
Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Poe, Gregory L..
Revised July 1998
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Information; Group size; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H41; C92.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7265
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The Changing Public Role in Services to Agriculture: The Case of Information AgEcon
Zezza, Annalisa.
The paper analyzes the changes that have taken place in the nature of agriculture information and their consequences on the public role of related public services with specific regard to process undergoing in the European Union. Increased interest in food quality and food safety issues in a global consumer driven society, together with major attention to environmental and ethical issues related to food production, enlarge both the object of agricultural information and the audience of stakeholders in the food chain and in the general public. Information policy with regard to a multifunctional approach to agriculture, can be finalized to correct three main sources of market failures as access to information, quality and adverse selection and externalities...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Information; Public goods; Food quality; Externalities; Public services; Extension; Public Economics.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24902
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A Közös Agrárpolitika reformja magyar (kutatói) szempontból AgEcon
Udovecz, Gabor.
Az EU Közös Agrárpolitikája az állandó kompromisszumok és a sorozatos reformok terméke. Most annyiban más a helyzet, hogy a döntéshozatali mechanizmusban a szokásosnál is nagyobb a társadalmi nyomás, emiatt pedig a pénzügyi determináltság. A jövő alakításában pedig mi magyarok is részt veszünk. Kivételes lehetőség tehát, hogy hazánk adottságai (erősségek, gyengeségek) alapján határozott agrárorintációt fejezzen ki, s ennek fő törekvéseire építse az ország KAP-álláspontját. Magyarország olyan KAP-ban érdekelt, amely – európai értékek mentén – minél több uniós forrást biztosít, de tágítja is a mozgásteret a nemzeti agrár- és vidékpolitikai célok megvalósításához. Összefoglalóan kiemelhető, hogy a KAP-reform döntési mechanizmusa bonyolult, Magyarország...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: EU Közös Agrárpolitika; Nemzeti agrárstratégia; Versenyképesség; Közjavak; EU Common Agricultural Policy; National agricultural strategy; Competitiveness; Public goods; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99189
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Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia AgEcon
Lopez, Maria Claudia; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both led to higher contributions. The results from the second stage reveal that government regulations always complemented community...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Field experiments; Public goods; Government regulation; Community enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C93; H41; Q2.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42128
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A vision of the future of the Common Agricultural Policy AgEcon
Elkes, Andrea; Halmai, Peter; Papp, Gergely; Udovecz, Gabor; Vasary, Viktoria.
The reforms proposed by the authors intend to ensure the economic, social and environmental sustainability of rural regions and place agricultural policy on a fundamentally different basis. The scope of community and state intervention will change. Payments linked to production will be cancelled and the provision of public goods will be rewarded instead. At the same time, measures aimed at enhancing the viability of the rural economy and society will become more significant. The depth of the changes calls for a new name expressing better the new approach, so instead of CAP the use of a more justified name is suggested: Common Agricultural and Rural Policy (CARP). This paper outlines the vision and the major proposals we suggest to meet the above mentioned...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: CAP; Reform; Public goods; Common Agricultural and Rural Policy; Vision.; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52194
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Global responsibility of food, energy and environmental security AgEcon
Popp, Jozsef.
This paper focuses on global responsibility of food, energy and environmental security. World population growth will lead to increasing demand for food and feed with increasing meat consumption. With globalization and urbanization production is moving to the most competitive countries and regions, and food trade is becoming more liberalized but also more concentrated. Growing energy demand and climate change will also influence food production. Additional challenges are increasing market volatility resulting from yield and climate change. We need greater responsibility in cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in showing greater respect for the environment. More responsibility is needed regarding food and energy security, and environmental sustainability....
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food security; Energy security; Environmental sustainability; Public goods; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52193
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Knowledge and the Valuation of Public Goods and Experiential Commodities: Information Provision and Acquisition AgEcon
Tisdell, Clement A..
Provides empirical evidence of significant lack of relevant knowledge of some public goods and experiential commodities. It also analyses whether information provision about the attributes or characteristics of commodities is likely to result in individuals’ finding their ‘true’ preferences for these, and identifies the type and nature of information that should be conveyed to enable commodities to be appropriately valued. It also recognizes that sometimes commodities may contain attributes that individuals are unable to evaluate. Furthermore, individuals acquire and filter information about commodities. Factors influencing these activities require analysis. A cost-benefit analysis of information acquisition suggests that individuals are less likely to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Behavioral economics; Contingent evaluation; Experiential commodities; Information; Knowledge; Public choice; Public goods; Nature conservation; Valuation; Public Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90545
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Public Goods, Hysteresis, and Underinvestment in Food Safety AgEcon
Richards, Timothy J.; Nganje, William E.; Acharya, Ram N..
Despite the economic damage inflicted by a foodborne disease outbreak, firms at all points in the supply chain appear to be reluctant to invest in the necessary food safety technologies and practices. We argue that these investments are subject to both hysteretic and public good effects, and construct a theoretical model of food safety investment, calibrated to describe the 2006 E. coli outbreak in California spinach. Both effects are found to induce delays in food safety investments, but the public good effect dominates. We suggest a number of policy options that improve incentives to contribute to the public good.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food safety; Hysteresis; Investment; Public goods; Real options; Simulation; Food Security and Poverty.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57627
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Can Calibration Reconcile Stated and Observed Preferences? AgEcon
Norwood, F. Bailey.
Hypothetical bias is a pervasive problem in stated-preference experiments. Recent research has developed two empirically successful calibrations to remove hypothetical bias, though the calibrations have not been tested using the same data or in a conjoint analysis. This study compares the two calibrations in a conjoint analysis involving donations to a public good. Results find the calibrations are biased predictors of true donations but that calibrated and uncalibrated models together provide upper and lower bounds to true donations.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Calibration; Experimental economics; Forecasting; Hypothetical bias; Public goods; Stated preference; Voluntary contributions; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Q51; H41.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43735
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The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation AgEcon
Groothuis, Peter A.; Whitehead, John C..
The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Provision point mechanism; Contingent valuation; Willingness to pay; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55542
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Policies for Promoting Public Goods in Agriculture AgEcon
Romstad, Eirik.
The ongoing negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on agriculture has triggered an increased interest in the linkages between commodity production and public goods in agriculture. This paper takes a closer look at this issue. Particular emphasis is placed on production economics and policy design issues. Production is placed in a multi-product multi-input setting. The provision of public goods from agriculture is analyzed utilizing a principle-agent framework. Particular emphasis is placed on issues pertaining to incentive compatibility, informational aspects and the participation constraint. Public finance aspects of various policies are also addressed. Price supports are of particular interest as they are widely used in European...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Multi-product production; Public goods; Agriculture; Principal-agent models; Resource allocation; Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24930
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The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Cherry, Todd L.; Stranlund, John K..
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Coalition formation; Inequality aversion; Participation requirement; Experiments; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; H41.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102265
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Green Giving: An Analysis of Contributions to Major U.S. Environmental Groups AgEcon
Richer, Jerrell.
Data are compiled from the tax records of 29 major environmental organizations for the period 1980-1994 to identify factors that influence voluntary contributions. I examine the effects of organizational characteristics, such as fundraising expenditures and alternative sources of revenue, along with the impact of general economic conditions and the political climate. I find that government grants to the organizations had a positive and statistically significant impact on voluntary contributions rather than a crowding out effect. Contributions were price inelastic, where the price is defined as the effective cost to the donor of achieving a one-dollar increase in the provision of program services. Resources devoted to fundraising had a strong and positive...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Charitable giving; Conservation; Crowding out; Environmental quality; Fundraising; Nonprofit organizations; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q0; H8.
Ano: 1995 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10870
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COMMON FINANCING FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY BUDGETARY QUESTIONS AgEcon
Vasary, Viktoria; Elekes, Andrea; Halmai, Peter.
Can we agree fully with the statement, that “agricultural spending is a major distorting factor in the EU economy and a distinct obstacle to the Lisbon agenda’s implementation”? (Gros, 2008) Is it without question that Europe’s agriculture is in position to become sustainable and competitive without certain kind of common policy with no Community financing? Is it unambiguous in every respect, that the challenges facing the sector – globalization, trade liberalization, climate change, water management, Lisbon process, enlargement, changing preferences – could be answered at national level utilizing exclusively national financial sources? The answers to these questions are complex. So the purpose of the paper is multiple: - Exploration of factors justifying...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Public goods; Fiscal federalism; A new agricultural policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Public Economics; Q14; Q18; H41.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44820
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The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126
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Comparing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Pro-Social Emotions to Enhance Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia AgEcon
Lopez, Maria Claudia; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..
This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual’s contribution and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are designed to motivate fully efficient contributions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Field experiments; Pro-social emotions; Social dilemma; Regulation; Enforcement.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C93; H41; Q20; Q28.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53126
Registros recuperados: 47
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