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Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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Cobourn, Kelly M.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Williams, Jeffrey C.; Zalom, Frank. |
Estimating the economic impact of a pest requires linking biological and economic systems via a damage function. The most common damage function approach links exogenous pest populations to cumulative commodity yield losses at harvest. This type of representation is a reduced form because is not pest population levels per se that drive damage, but the underlying factors that affect pest populations and the susceptibility of the host. We specify and estimate a structural damage function and compare the results with those of the reduced form. We do so using two alternative models, one that explains the level of crop damage from a pest, and one that explains the timing of that damage during the host’s growing season. We address our objectives within an... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6530 |
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Alexander, Corinne E.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
Agency theory explanations for agricultural contract designs are often observationally equivalent to perfect information explanations. Further in order to test properly the hypothesis that moral hazard is important one must first test and accept the hypothesis that agents respond to contract incentives. If agents do not respond to contract incentives then it is unlikely that moral hazard is significant. Accordingly we move beyond contract design and focus on whether or not we can reject the hypothesis that moral hazard is important by examining growers responses to price incentives for processing tomato quality. We utilize a natural experiment. In our data set growers deliver processing tomatoes under a price incentives contract and for a fixed price per... |
Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123595 |
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Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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