Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (21) ArchiMer (1) Autor Stranlund, John K. (6) Murphy, James J. (3) Spraggon, John M. (3) Crowe, Bronwyn (2) Giannakas, Konstantinos (2) Lankoski, Jussi E. (2) Lichtenberg, Erik (2) McEvoy, David M. (2) Ollikainen, Markku (2) Pannell, David J. (2) White, Benedict (2) Anderson, Christopher M. (1) Bellanger, Manuel (1) Bhattacharya, Utpal (1) Chavez, Carlos A. (1) D'Amato, Alessio (1) Daouk, Hazem (1) Devine, John H. (1) Dumas, Christopher F. (1) Giudicissi, Eufrasia (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Enforcement (22) Environmental Economics and Policy (13) Compliance (8) Monitoring (7) L51 (6) Q58 (6) Agricultural and Food Policy (4) Public Economics (4) C91 (3) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (3) Uncertainty (3) Biotechnology (2) Conservation (2) Emissions Taxes (2) Emissions trading (2) Environmental regulation (2) Institutions (2) K42 (2) Laboratory experiments (2) Nutrient runoff (2) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (12) Conference Paper or Presentation (7) Journal Article (2) Text (1) Ano 2019 (1) 2011 (1) 2010 (4) 2009 (4) 2008 (6) 2007 (2) 2004 (1) 2003 (1) 2001 (1) 2000 (1) Mais... País United States (21) France (1) Idioma Inglês (22)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 22 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence AgEcon McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K.. This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126 Monitoring of Compliance in Western Australian Conservation Contracts AgEcon Crowe, Bronwyn; White, Benedict; Pannell, David J.. Contracting with private landholders for labor towards production of environmental services (payment for actions) or the environmental services themselves (payment for outcomes) is reliant on the environmental organization’s ability to monitor and assess the environmental outcomes provided. Inaccurate and costly assessment reduces the cost effectiveness of the contract. Different assessment technologies will have different impacts on the cost effectiveness and optimal contracting choice of the environmental organization. The paper compares the influence of field assessment by a local expert, and remote assessment via satellite imagery, on the optimal contracting decision for the Western Australian wheat belt. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Conservation; Environmental; Compliance; Monitoring; Enforcement; Environmental regulation; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91155 Registros recuperados: 22 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco