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| Registros recuperados: 118 | |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper derives and implements formulas for the welfare effects of differentiated and uniform mileage taxes, gasoline taxes, and per mile insurance premiums, for reducing the external costs of passenger vehicle accidents. The model distinguishes three driver groups and five vehicle groups, and we obtain estimates of external accident costs per mile for each group from crash data. The (average) external accident cost is estimated at 2.2-6.6 cents per mile. Accidents costs differ substantially across drivers of different ages, but only moderately across different vehicles groups. Annual welfare gains from a mileage tax differentiated across drivers and vehicles according to marginal external costs are $9.4 billion in the benchmark case. The uniform... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Traffic accidents; External costs; Pricing policies; Insurance reform; Public Economics; R48; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10674 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua; Sacheti, Sandeep. |
| We compare the short-run and long-run effects of environmental reform and harmonization under autarky and free trade. When trade is driven by environmental distortions rather than real relative advantages, harmonization of environmental policies, even if achieved by lowering standards in one country, can improve short-run aggregate welfare. With the possibility of multiple steady states, long-run considerations favor a "race to the top" rather than a "race to the bottom" even when upward and downward harmonizations are equivalent in the short run. For a country trapped in a low (or bad) steady state, environmental reform may not move it to a high (or good) steady state under autarky. However, under trade, harmonization of policies may enable this country... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International trade and the environment; Environmental policy reform; International harmonization of environmental policies; Environmental dynamics and trade; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; Q20; F10; H23. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25099 |
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| Font, Antoni Riers; Parrilla, Javier Capo; Tous, Teresa Palmer. |
| La globalización, así como el turismo internacional, son dos de los fenómenos económicos más analizados en los últimos años, tanto por su creciente importancia como por sus visibles efectos sobre la economía. La notable expansión del turismo tiene como origen, en gran parte, las mismas causas que explican la globalización económica, de ahí que, a menudo, se hable deglobalización turística. Uno de los argumentos más utilizados por los detractores de la globalización es su elevado impacto en términos ambientales. En este sentido, resulta obligado reflexionar sobre la existencia de un potencial conflicto entre el, cada vez mayor, desarrollo turístico y la conservación de los recursos naturales. Una cuestión ésta que adquiere especial importancia en el caso... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Globalization; Tourism; Environmental Impacts; Management Tools of Natural Resources; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; F18; H23; L83; Q34. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7994 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| This paper uses analytical and numerical models to illustrate how the presence of other distortions within the transport system changes the overall welfare effect of a congestion tax. These other distortions include a transit fare subsidy, congestion on competing (unpriced) routes, accident externalities, gasoline taxes, and pollution externalities. Each of these pre-existing distortions can substantially alter the welfare effect of a congestion tax that would be predicted by a first-best analysis. If congestion taxes encourage travel on other congested routes, they can produce sizeable indirect welfare losses. In addition, induced reductions in the demand for gasoline can lead to substantial welfare losses when, as appears to be the case for European... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Congestion tax; Welfare effect; Transit subsidy; Gasoline tax; Accidents; Pollution; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10678 |
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| Pezzey, John C.V.. |
| We compare three different views on the long run efficiencies of emission taxes which include thresholds, and of tradable emission permits where some permits are initially free. The differences are caused by different assumptions about whether thresholds and free permits should be subsidies given only to firms that produce, or full property rights. Treating tax thresholds, as well as free permits, as property rights would depart from the conventional view, but would allow greater flexibility in making economic instruments both efficient and acceptable. Such flexibility could be very important in achieving efficent control of greenhouse gas emissions. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; Q28. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58198 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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| Ranjan, Ram. |
| This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642 |
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| Jou, Jyh-Bang; Lee, Tan. |
| This article compares the effects of various fiscal policies on choices of development timing and capital intensity when rents on housing follow geometric Brownian motion with those when rents follow arithmetic Brownian motion. These policy instruments include fees on capital, housing, and land, and taxes on urban income, and properties both before and after development. Regardless of the motion of rents, when one choice is fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the other choice are qualitatively the same. When the two choices are determined endogenously, although these policy instruments exhibit the same qualitative effect on the choice of development timing, they may exhibit different effects on the choice of capital intensity if rents on... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Capital intensity; Development Timing; Fees; Taxation; Real Options; International Development; G13; H21; H23; R52. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10352 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Small, Kenneth A.. |
| This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios, with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income. Under our central parameter values, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $1.01/gal for the US and $1.34/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due mainly to a higher assumed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pollution; Congestion; Accidents; Fiscal interactions; Public Economics; H21; H23; R48. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10461 |
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| Walls, Margaret; Hanson, Jean. |
| One of the most common criticisms of pollution taxes is that they are often believed to be inequitable -- i.e., low income households are thought to be disproportionately harmed. In this paper, we assess the distributional impacts of three taxes aimed at reducing emissions from motor vehicles: (i) a tax on total annual emissions, (ii) a tax on emissions rates (in grams per mile), and (iii) a tax on annual miles traveled. We use two alternative measures of economic well-being, annual household income and a constructed measure of lifetime income. We find that all three fees look regressive, both on the basis of annual and lifetime income - though much less so on a lifetime income basis. However, if one of these fees is used to substitute for existing vehicle... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Motor vehicle emissions; Tax incidence; Lifetime income; Political Economy; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10895 |
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| van Kooten, G. Cornelis. |
| Activities that remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it in forest and agricultural ecosystems can generate CO2-offset credits that can thus substitute for CO2 emissions reduction. Are biological CO2-uptake activities competitive with CO2 offsets from reduced fossil fuel use? In this paper, it is argued that transaction costs impose a formidable obstacle to direct substitution of carbon uptake offsets for emissions reduction in trading schemes, and that separate caps should be set for emissions reduction and sink-related activities. While a tax/subsidy scheme is preferred to emissions trading for incorporating biologically-generated CO2 offsets, contracts that focus on the activity and not the amount of carbon sequestered are most likely to lead to the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon sequestration; Transaction costs; Climate change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; Q54; Q23; Q42; H23; D23. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45505 |
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| Registros recuperados: 118 | |
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