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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (28) Autor Karp, Larry S. (3) Bayer, Patrick (2) Bosetti, Valentina (2) Cardenas, Juan-Camilo (2) Carraro, Carlo (2) Duval, Romain (2) Good, Darrel L. (2) Irwin, Scott H. (2) Jackson, Thomas E. (2) Kopp, Raymond J. (2) Tavoni, Massimo (2) Ahlheim, Michael (1) Aisbett, Emma (1) Alston, Julian M. (1) Bertacchini, Enrico (1) Brunke, Henrich (1) Calatrava-Requena, Javier (1) Carmona-Torres, Carmen (1) Carson, Richard T. (1) Conaway, Michael (1) Mais... Palavra-chave H4 (28) Environmental Economics and Policy (12) Q2 (7) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (6) Q54 (5) Contingent valuation (4) H0 (4) H3 (4) Labor and Human Capital (4) Q1 (4) Community/Rural/Urban Development (3) D6 (3) D8 (3) Public Economics (3) Q5 (3) Q51 (3) Z1 (3) C72 (2) C9 (2) Collective Action (2) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (16) Conference Paper or Presentation (9) Journal Article (2) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2010 (3) 2009 (6) 2008 (1) 2007 (2) 2006 (7) 2003 (2) 1998 (2) 1997 (3) 1996 (1) Mais... País United States (28) Idioma Inglês (27) Espanhol (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 28 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última 1995 PRICING PERFORMANCE OF MARKET ADVISORY SERVICES FOR CORN AND SOYBEANS AgEcon Jackson, Thomas E.; Irwin, Scott H.; Good, Darrel L.. The purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service pricing performance in 1995 for corn and soybeans. Specifically, the average price received by a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1995. The average net advisory price across all 25 corn programs is $3.04 per bushel. The range of net advisory prices for corn is quite large, with a minimum of $2.34 per bushel and a maximum of $3.81 per bushel. The average net advisory price across all 25 soybean programs is $6.61 per bushel. As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is substantial, with a minimum of $5.75 per bushel and a maximum of $7.92 per bushel. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project; D4; D7; D8; G1; G2; H4; H8; Q1; Z1; Marketing. Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14790 Food Security and Efficacy of the Intervention Mechanism in India AgEcon Prahadeeswaran, M.; Ramasamy, C.; Selvaraj, K.N.. Rice and wheat are the two major foodgrains in India and their level of production determines the country self-sufficient. Forecasts on cereals supply range from 250 to over 300 million tones in the country by the year 2020. Mere availability of foodgrains is not a sufficient condition to ensure food security but also necessary that the poor have sufficient means to purchase food. Poor economic access leads to food security and it has been checked by the government mechanism through the operation of Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) and foodgrains are distributed at subsidized prices to the people living Below Poverty Line (BPL). It is a safety net to more than 330 million poor and those nutritionally at risk and an important delivery channel with... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Food Security; Targeted Public Distribution System; Fair Price Shops; Minimum Support Price; Monte Carlo Technique; Food Security and Poverty; J21; H4; H5; O2; Q18. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25465 International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment AgEcon Hong, Fuhsai; Karp, Larry S.. We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreement; Climate agreement; Participation game; Investment; Mixed strategy; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H4; Q54. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123719 Allocation of Orbit and Spectrum Resources for Regional Communications: What's at Stake? AgEcon MacAuley, Molly K.. Contentious debate surrounds allocation of the geostationary orbit and electromagnetic spectrum, two resources used by communications satellites. An extensive economics literature alleges that the nonmarket administrative allocative procedures now in place are highly inefficient, but no research has empirically estimated the welfare loss. This paper develops a conceptual framework and a computerized model to estimate the economic value of the resources, the size and distribution of welfare costs associated with the present regulatory regime, and the potential gains from more market-like allocation. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Outer space; Communications satellites; Pricing natural resources; Community/Rural/Urban Development; H4; Q2. Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10746 What Should We Expect from Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-Related R&D AgEcon Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Duval, Romain; Tavoni, Massimo. This paper addresses two basic issues related to technological innovation and climate stabilisation objectives: i) Can innovation policies be effective in stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations? ii) To what extent can innovation policies complement carbon pricing (taxes or permit trading) and improve the economic efficiency of a mitigation policy package? To answer these questions, we use an integrated assessment model with multiple externalities and an endogenous representation of technical progress in the energy sector. We evaluate a range of innovation policies, both as a stand-alone instrument and in combination with other mitigation policies. Even under fairly optimistic assumptions about the funding available for, and the returns to R&D, our... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Change; Environmental Policy; Energy R&D Fund; Stabilisation Costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; H0; H2; H3; H4; O3; Q32; Q43; Q54. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60745 NORMS, SELF-SANCTIONING, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC GOOD AgEcon Interis, Matthew G.; Haab, Timothy C.. The relationship between norms, self-sanctioning, and people’s decisions about contributing to public goods is complex and often misunderstood in the public goods literature. We develop a model in which individuals hold an injunctive norm indicating how much they believe one should contribute to the public good. From the model we derive the following testable hypotheses: an increase in one’s perception of the norm level of contribution to the public good (1) induces negative self-sanctioning and (2) will lead one to contribute more to the public good, and (3) that contributing to the public good induces positive self-sanctioning. To test these hypotheses, we elicit stated preferences for contributions to an organization which offsets carbon emissions... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Public goods; Norms; Sanctioning; Image; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; H4; Q5; D0. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55964 Collective Action for Watershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya AgEcon Cardenas, Juan-Camilo; Rodriguez, Luz Angela; Johnson, Nancy L.. The dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Collective Action; Watersheds; Field Experiments; Colombia; Kenya; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q0; Q2; C9; H3; H4. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91169 Rural Gaps in Participation in Early Childhood Education AgEcon Temple, Judy A.. While state government spending on early education has grown in recent years, accessibility of preschool programs for rural children remains a problem. Using census-tract data from a nationally-representative data set on U.S. children, multinomial logit estimation reveals significant differences in early education experiences between rural and nonrural children. Both rural children and children of less-educated mothers are less likely to participate in preschool. This paper concludes by discussing the appropriate role of local, state, or federal governments in funding rural preschool programs. While early educational investments are being touted as effective economic development tools, the nature of the positive externalities associated with preschool... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Early education; Human capital; Preschool; Rural education; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; I2; R0; H4. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53085 Registros recuperados: 28 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última

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