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| Registros recuperados: 56 | |
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| Calcott, Paul; Walls, Margaret. |
| Several studies that have solved for optimal solid waste policy instruments have suggested that transaction costs may often prevent the working of recycling markets. In this paper, we explicitly incorporate such costs into a general equilibrium model of production, consumption, recycling, and disposal. Specifically, we assume that consumers have access to both recycling without payment and recycling with payment but that the latter option comes with transaction costs. Producers choose material and nonmaterial inputs to produce a consumer product, and they also choose design attributes of that product-its weight and degree of recyclability. We find that the policy instruments that yield a social optimum in this setting need to vary with the degree of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dfe; Deposit-refund; Disposal fee; Constrained optimum; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10900 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper discusses how carbon abatement policies interact with the tax system, and how these interactions affect the overall costs of carbon controls. We provide formulas for adjusting cost estimates of auctioned and grandfathered carbon emissions from partial equilibrium energy models into rough estimates of general equilibrium costs that account for fiscal interactions. In the basic model with a tax on labor income, the general equilibrium costs of (revenue-neutral) auctioned permits are around 25% higher than the partial equilibrium costs; those of grandfathered permits, which do not directly raise revenues for recycling, are typically more than 100% higher. However, when allowance is made for complicating factors, such as the effect of tax subsidies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon permits; Tax distortions; Revenue recycling; General equilibrium costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Q28; H21. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10481 |
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| Jaeger, William K.. |
| Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question, though, has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, an expression for marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting, making it an unreliable proxy for the first-best Pigouvian rate. With these concerns in mind, the current analysis... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Optimal Environmental Tax; Second-best; Double Dividend; Tax Interaction Effect; Revenue Recycling; Tax Base Effect; Pigouvian Rate; Excess Burden; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q5. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50358 |
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| Roumasset, James A.; Pitafi, Basharat A.K.. |
| Conserving the watershed can help to preserve the groundwater supplies by avoiding loss of recharge. Preventing overuse of available water through pricing reforms can also substantially increase benefits from groundwater stock. Since efficiency prices are generally higher than the inefficient, status quo prices, efficiency pricing may be politically infeasible and watershed conservation may be considered as an alternative. Using Pearl Harbor water district as an example, we find that pricing reform yields large welfare improvement (about $900 million) and is welfare-superior to watershed conservation unless the latter prevents over 10% loss of recharge. In addition, watershed conservation is more valuable at efficiency pricing than at the status quo prices. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Watershed conservation; Water pricing; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D62; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20133 |
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| Bollen, Johannes; Hers, Sebastiaan; van der Zwaan, Bob. |
| This article presents an integrated assessment of climate change, air pollution, and energy security policy. Basis of our analysis is the MERGE model, designed to study the interaction between the global economy, energy use, and the impacts of climate change. For our purposes we expanded MERGE with expressions that quantify damages incurred to regional economies as a result of air pollution and lack of energy security. One of the main findings of our cost-benefit analysis is that energy security policy alone does not decrease the use of oil: global oil consumption is only delayed by several decades and oil reserves are still practically depleted before the end of the 21st century. If, on the other hand, energy security policy is integrated with optimal... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Change; Air Pollution; Energy Security; Cost-Benefit Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; D58; C61; O33; Q40. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55332 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper develops an analytical framework for comparing the marginal excess burden (MEB) of labor taxes and various commodity taxes, allowing for externalities and interactions between the taxes, and applies the analysis to the United Kingdom. Due to parameter uncertainty and model simplifications the results should be viewed with caution, nonetheless there are some useful insights. For example, even though taxes on petrol and cigarettes confer externality benefits, and these goods are relatively weak leisure substitutes, the MEB of these taxes may substantially exceed that of the labor income tax, except under "high" scenarios for externality benefits. In contrast the MEB for alcohol taxes may be smaller than that of the labor tax, though it is still... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Welfare cost; Labor tax; Cigarette tax; Alcohol tax; Petrol tax; Externalities; Political Economy; H21; H23; Q28. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10860 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-existing factor tax distortions for the welfare effects of restrictive trade policies in economies with and without market power in trade. We analyze tariffs, nonauctioned import quotas (with rents accruing to domestic firms) and voluntary export restraints (with rents accruing to foreign firms). We find that allowing for interactions with pre-existing taxes can greatly magnify the overall costs of these policies, f{fn possibly by over several hundred percent! In the case of import tariffs, much of this additional cost can be offset if the tariff revenues are used to reduce other distortionary taxes. Indeed the cost discrepancy between revenue-neutral... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Pre-existing tax distortions; Tariffs; Import quotas; Second-best welfare costs; International Relations/Trade; F10; H21. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10563 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| It is widely perceived that projected public spending on transportation infrastructure in the metropolitan Washington, DC, area for the next 20 years will not be enough to halt, let alone reverse, the trend of increasing traffic congestion. Consequently, there has been much debate about how additional sources of local revenues might be raised to finance more transportation spending. This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising $500 million per annum in local revenue from five possible sources. These sources are increasing labor taxes, property taxes, gasoline taxes, transit fares, and implementing congestion taxes. Our model incorporates congestion and pollution externalities, and it allows for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Transportation; Taxes; Washington DC; Welfare cost; Public Economics; R48; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10552 |
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| Goulder, Lawrence H.; Parry, Ian W.H.; Williams, Roberton C., III; Burtraw, Dallas. |
| This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with pre-existing factor taxes. We compare the costs and overall efficiency impacts of emissions taxes, emissions quotas, fuels taxes, performance standards, and mandated technologies, and explore how costs change with the magnitude of pre-existing taxes and the extent of pollution abatement. We find that the presence of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement under each instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world. This extra cost is an increasing function of the magnitude of pre-existing tax rates. For plausible values of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: General equilibrium efficiency analysis; Environmental instrument choice; Second-best regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D58; H21; L51. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10522 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation at the margin, when revenues are returned in lump-sum transfers. We find that the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can be larger than the Pigouvian efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion externality. In contrast, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes the net impact on labor supply is positive, and the efficiency gain in the labor market can raise the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent. Recycling congestion tax revenues in public... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externalities; Congestion taxes; Pre-existing tax distortions; General equilibrium; Welfare effects; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10548 |
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| Bovenberg, A. Lans; Goulder, Lawrence H.. |
| The most cost-effective policies for achieving CO2 abatement (e.g., carbon taxes) are considered politically unacceptable because of distributional consequences. This paper explores policies designed to address distributional concerns. Using an intertemporal, numerical general equilibrium model of the United States, we examine how efficiency costs change when CO2 abatement policies include elements that neutralize adverse impacts on energy industries. We find that desirable distributional outcomes can be achieved at relatively low cost in terms of efficiency. Without substantial added cost to the overall economy, the government can implement carbon abatement policies that protect profits and equity values in fossil-fuel industries. The key to this... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Distributional impacts; General equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H22; L51; D58. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10647 |
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| Hoel, Michael; Karp, Larry S.. |
| We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and the environmental damage depends on the stock of pollution. We thus extend, to a dynamic framework, previous studies in which environmental damages depend on the flow of pollution. As with the static analysis, an increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. In addition, in the dynamic model, an increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favor the use of taxes. Taxes certainly dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Taxes and quotas; Stochastic control; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25010 |
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| Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Political pressure often exists to earmark environmental tax revenues or permit rents to the industry affected by the regulation. This paper analyzes schemes that rebate revenues based on output shares: tradable performance standards, an emissions tax with market-share rebates, and tradable permits with output-based allocation. All three policies effectively combine a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. The result is a shifting of emissions control efforts toward greater emissions rate reduction and less output contraction, with higher marginal costs of control and lower output prices compared to the social optimum, given any targeted level of abatement. These welfare costs depend on the degree of output substitutability and are likely to be much... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission tax; Permit allocation; Earmarking; Tradable performance standards; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H23; Q2. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10709 |
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| Registros recuperados: 56 | |
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