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| Registros recuperados: 993 | |
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| Tesfatsion, Leigh. |
| For a postscript copy of this paper, click <a href="/Data/isu/er45.ps"> here. </A> Agent-base computational economics (ACE) is roughly defined as the computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentralized systems of autonomous interacting agents. A key focus of ACE research is understanding how global regularities arise from the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of autonomous agents channeled through socio-economic institutions, rather than from top down coordination mechanisms such as imposed market clearing constraints or an assumption of single representative agents. This paper discusses how ACE materials have been introduced into graduate-level course in macroeconomic theory over the past several years,... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18193 |
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| Mogues, Tewodaj; Carter, Michael R.. |
| This paper explores the idea that how wealth is distributed across social groups (ethnic or language groups, gender, etc.) fundamentally affects the evolution of economic inequality. By providing microfoundations suitable for this exploration, this paper hopes to enhance our understanding of when social forces contribute to the reproduction of economic inequality, and what the relevant policy implications might be. In tackling this issue, this paper offers contributions in two domains. First, it adds a dimension to the literature on social capital. Second, it offers a modest generalization of the concepts of identity, alienation and economic polarization used by Esteban and Ray (1994). This generalization permits us to consider the multiple characteristics... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20132 |
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| Kinateder, Markus. |
| Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation; Imperfect Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50722 |
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| Alaverdyan, Arusyak; Houston, Jack E.. |
| Experiences of Water Consumers Cooperatives accumulated in Armenia during the past six years have been mixed. Some cooperatives have provided evidence of being capable of organizing themselves and responding to the needs of their members more effectively than any central governmental organization. However, many other aspects are still unresolved. Created in 2001, the State Committee for Water Economy (SCWE) agreed recently to follow a more participatory approach in establishment of Water Users Associations and, on the basis of positive experiences worldwide, SCWE is willing also to scale up the process to the level of Water Users Federations. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36271 |
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| Registros recuperados: 993 | |
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