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| Registros recuperados: 147 | |
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| Paulson, Nicholas D.; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| The increase in vertical integration in agriculture has been motivated by many factors including the evolving demand of consumers as well as factors specific to agricultural markets (i.e. production and price uncertainty and farm policy). The literature on agricultural contracts has focused more on contracting in the livestock sector relative to crop production under contract, most likely due to the fact that contracting in livestock production has been historically more prevalent. However, crop production under contract has also realized extensive growth, especially in the markets for crops with specialty traits. This paper provides a theoretical model of a contracting relationship between a risk-neutral monopsonistic processor of a specialty crop and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9856 |
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| Carriquiry, Miguel A.; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Hotelling's classic model of spatial competition is used to estimate the impacts on price of the closure of one of three grain buyers on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of Scott County, Iowa. The customers of the buyer who is closing (River Gulf Grain Company) in Davenport, Iowa, are assumed to deliver their grain to a buyer in either Buffalo, Iowa, to the south or to a buyer in Clinton, Iowa, to the north. Calibration of Hotelling's framework to this situation leads to an estimated decline in grain bids of 1.5¢ per bushel for the buyer located in Clinton and by 2.5¢ per bushel for the buyer located in Buffalo. These estimates are based on an incremental transportation cost of 0.15¢ per mile between the seller's farm and the buyer. This price decline... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Grain transportation; Local monopsony; Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18370 |
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| Hart, Chad E.; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| The current farm program contains a marketing loan program that offers grain farmers two options at harvest time to counter low market prices. Farmers can either take a loan deficiency payment (LDP) on harvested production, or farmers can place production "under loan." The LDP pays the farmer the difference between the loan rate and a government-calculated price (the posted county price), which changes daily. Once the LDP has been taken the farmer can either market the crop or store it, but all further government assistance is ended. A farmer who puts the crop under loan stores the crop and receives a loan from the government. If the market price rises above the loan rate, the farmer can pay off the loan, market the crop, and pocket the difference. If the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18310 |
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| Hart, Chad E.; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| This paper provides a one-year forward-looking analysis of a revenue countercyclical farm program. The basis for the revenue countercyclical farm program originates from the National Corn Growers Association's (NCGA) farm bill proposal. We explore several options under this program. The options consist of various crop loan rate levels for corn and soybeans. The amount and distribution of payments to producers under the various NCGA options and the Agricultural Act of 2001 (House Resolution 2646) are examined and compared against expected payments under the current array of farm programs. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18300 |
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| Babcock, Bruce A.; Chalfant, James A.; Collender, Robert N.. |
| Multicrop farmers must choose variable input levels and land quantity for each crop. Economic researchers to date have analyzed these two decisions separately, either finding the best land use, given crop technologies, or solving for optimal input levels, ignoring the allocation of land. We show that both these approaches lead to suboptimal decision rules under risk aversion. An empirical example demonstrates that a risk-averse farmer who makes these decisions sequentially-first choosing input levels then allocating land-rather than simultaneously, may significantly understates the value of farming. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 1987 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/32226 |
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| Babcock, Bruce A.; Hart, Chad E.. |
| Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Farm safety net; Revenue targeting; U.S. farm programs; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18284 |
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| Hurley, Terrance M.; Babcock, Bruce A.; Hellmich, Richard L.. |
| Genetically engineered crops offer farmers a new option for controlling pests. The high efficacy of these pesticidal crops, combined with the potential for widespread adoption, has raised concerns that pest resistance may prematurely diminish their value. In response to these concerns, the Environmental Protection Agency requires resistance management plans. Current resistance management plans rely on a high-dose refuge strategy. This analysis extends the current framework for evaluating high-dose refuge strategies to include a measure of agricultural productivity and conventional pesticide use. The economic tradeoff relative to agricultural productivity, conventional pesticide use, and pest resistance is assessed when Bt corn is planted to control... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31156 |
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| Babcock, Bruce A.; Beghin, John C.; Mohanty, Samarendu; Fuller, Frank H.; Chaudhary, Sudhir; Fabiosa, Jacinto F.; Kovarik, Karen; Hart, Chad E.; Fang, Cheng; Kaus, Phillip J.; Naik, Manta; Womack, Abner W.; Young, Robert E., II; Suhler, Gregg; Westhoff, Patrick C.; Trujillo, Joe; Brown, D. Scott; Adams, Gary M.; Willott, Brian; Thompson, Wyatt; Madison, Daniel; Meyer, Seth D.; Mills, Russell C.; Zimmel, Peter; Lansford, Vernon; Kruse, John R.. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/32050 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18606 |
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| Wu, JunJie; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Green payment programs, where the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper presents a voluntary green payment program using the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information. The information asymmetry arises because government knows only the distribution of individual farmers' production situations, rather than farm-specific information. The program is applied to irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a nonpoint source of pollution. We demonstrate empirically that a green payment program can increase farm... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18325 |
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| Pautsch, Gregory R.; Babcock, Bruce A.; Breidt, F. Jay. |
| Studies examining the value of switching to a variable rate technology (VRT) fertilizer program assume producers possess perfect soil nitrate information. In reality, producers estimate soil nitrate levels with soil sampling. The value of switching to a VRT program depends on the quality of the estimates and on how the estimates are used. Larger samples sizes, increased spatial correlation, and decreased variability improve the estimates and increase returns. Fertilizing strictly to the estimated field map fails to account for estimation risk. Returns increase if the soil sample information is used in a Bayesian fashion to update the soil nitrate beliefs in nonsampled sites. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30797 |
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| Registros recuperados: 147 | |
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