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| Registros recuperados: 269 | |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Grandfathered emissions permits redistribute income to wealthy households by creating firm rents that ultimately accrue to shareholders. Consequently, they can be highly regressive, even if the poor do not have large budget shares for polluting goods. Using an analytical model, this paper estimates the burden borne by different income groups when emissions permits are used to control power plant emissions of carbon, SO2, and NOx. We also compare the burden borne by poor households under permits with that under emissions taxes, performance standards, technology mandates, and input taxes. And we show how the social costs of policies differ from efficiency costs when society has aversion to inequality. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Equity effects; Pollution controls; Emissions permits; Social welfare function; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10523 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele. |
| Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of “where” flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to “when” flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission Trading; Banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6362 |
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| Alberini, Anna; Austin, David H.. |
| Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on the polluter will induce firms to handle hazardous wastes properly and to avoid disposing them into the environment. Economic theory and a few well-publicized cases, however, suggest that a number of factors may dilute the incentives posed by strict liability. In this paper, we run regressions relating unintended releases of pollution into the environment (aggregated at the state level, and followed over nine years from 1987 to 1995) to the imposition of strict liability on the polluter, exploiting variation across states in the liability provisions of their mini-Superfund laws, and in the years these were adopted. We experiment with instrumental variable... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Toxic spills; Policy endogeneity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; C33; K32. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10450 |
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| Lile, Ronald D.; Powell, Mark R.; Toman, Michael. |
| The "Clean Development Mechanism" (CDM) contained in the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides, for the first time, the capacity for industrialized countries to claim credits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions or offsets undertaken in cooperation with host developing countries. However, the Protocol provides no guidance on how these cooperative activities for GHG reduction and sustainable development would be undertaken in practice, including the particularly important issue of the relationship of the private sector vis-à-vis government institutions in designing, financing, and securing approval for jointly implemented GHG abatement projects. The pilot program for "Activities... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate change; Joint implementation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; F21. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10868 |
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| Hahn, Robert W.; Stavins, Robert N.. |
| We investigate a central issue in the climate change debate associated with the Kyoto Protocol: the likely performance of international greenhouse gas trading mechanisms. Virtually all design studies and many projections of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets have assumed that an international trading program can be established that minimizes the costs of meeting overall goals. This conclusion rests on several simplifying assumptions. We focus on one important issue that has received little, if any, attention: the interaction between an international trading regime and a heterogeneous set of domestic greenhouse policy instruments. This is an important issue because the Protocol explicitly provides for domestic sovereignty regarding instrument choice,... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate change; Tradable permits; International policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; Q25. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10747 |
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| Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele; Nicita, Lea. |
| This paper analyses whether and how a climate policy designed to stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is likely to change the direction and pace of technical progress. The analysis is performed using an upgraded version of WITCH, a dynamic integrated regional model of the world economy. In this version, a non-energy R&D Sector, which enhances the productivity of the capital-labor aggregate, has been added to the energy R&D sector included in the original WITCH model. We find that, as a consequence of climate policy, R&D is re-directed towards energy knowledge. Nonetheless, total R&D investments decrease, due to a more than proportional contraction of non-energy R&D. Indeed, when non-energy and energy inputs are weakly... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Technical Change; Climate Policy; Stabilization Cost; R&D Investments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50357 |
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| Registros recuperados: 269 | |
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