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| Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.. |
| The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit grid pricing mechanisms over the last decade represents initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved source verification procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before more widespread adoption of such... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Marketing; Production Economics; Cattle and beef markets; Information transmission; Producer alliance. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57703 |
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| Babcock, Bruce A.; Beghin, John C.; Duffy, Michael D.; Feng, Hongli; Hueth, Brent; Kling, Catherine L.; Kurkalova, Lyubov A.; Schneider, Uwe A.; Secchi, Silvia; Weninger, Quinn; Zhao, Jinhua. |
| As Congress develops new farm legislation, some are lobbying for a new partnership between U.S. taxpayers and farmers. In exchange for an annual transfer of $10 to $20 billion from taxpayers to agriculture, farmers would do much more to enhance environmental quality. An attractive feature of a new partnership is that paying for an improved environment provides a clear and justifiable rationale for farm program payments, something that is lacking under current farm programs. By changing management practices and land use, farmers can provide cleaner water, cleaner air, better wildlife habitat, lower net greenhouse gas emissions, and improved long-run soil quality. Private profit maximizers largely ignore the value of these environmental goods. Hence, the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36920 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We develop a financial-contracting theory of the cooperative firm where production requires three generic tasks: working, managing, and monitoring. Workers provide an intermediate input (or labor directly); managers convert the workers' input into a final output; and directors monitor managers. We model the cooperative firm by letting the workers act also as directors. We show how bundling the labor and monitoring tasks can expand the scope for equilibrium market activity, even when doing so results in a strictly positive deadweight loss. Our theory provides new insight with respect to a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the “life cycle” of worker-managed firms, and with respect to a complementary body of anecdotal evidence on the causes... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital; Production Economics. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92122 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.. |
| The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit "grid" pricing mechanisms over the last decade represent initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved "source verification" procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before more widespread adoption of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21989 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among firms in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing generally leads to increases in expected total welfare but may reduce expected firm profits. Even when expected firm profits increase, information sharing does not represent equilibrium behavior because firms face a prisoner?s dilemma in which it is privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report truthfully. This equilibrium can be overcome if firms commit to simultaneously reporting their information and if reports are verifiable. We argue that agricultural bargaining associations serve both these roles. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Bargaining; Imperfect competition; Information; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18576 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| We use historical variation in the market share of agricultural cooperatives to examine the nature of the cooperative firm. Our data include the share of sectoral output accounted for by cooperative firms across 15 commodity sectors during the period 1930-2002. We test a simple financial contracting model where the cooperative firm is viewed as a particular implementation of "monitored credit" (or "informed intermediation"). Controlling for sectoral and year effects, we find support for the main prediction of our model with a positive and statistically significant relationship between cooperative market share and real annual lending rates. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19324 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ibarburu, Maro A.; Kliebenstein, James B.. |
| We study business organization and coordination of specialty-market hog production using a comparative analysis of two Iowa pork niche-marketing firms. We describe and analyze each firm's management of five key organizational challenges: planning and logistics, quality assurance, process verification and management of "credence attributes," business structure, and profit sharing. Although each firm is engaged in essentially the same activity, there are substantial differences across the two firms in the way production and marketing are coordinated. These differences are partly explained by the relative size and age of each firm, thus highlighting the importance of organizational evolution in agricultural markets, but are also partly the result of a formal... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Specialty hogs; Coordination; Contracting; Organizational design; Niche markets; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18340 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| We examine interactions among explicit and implicit contracting practices for a sample of 385 intermediaries in California fruit and vegetable markets. Explicit practices are measured with an indicator for the existence of a formal contract, and with indicators for various contract specifications (e.g., target delivery date, volume, acreage). Implicit practices are measured directly with a question about the existence of an “implicit understanding,” and indirectly with questions about the extent of informal involvement in farm-level decision making. Firms that manufacture processed foods, and that grow in house a portion of their total farm input, are significantly more likely to report use of explicit and implicit contracting practices. Additionally,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6068 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| This paper identifies market and commodity characteristics that seem to support successful cooperative bargaining in markets for farm output. Bargaining is not just about increasing prices paid to farmers; indeed, although there is very little empirical research that addresses the issue, what evidence does exist suggests that cooperative bargaining has very little direct influence on price. Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may be useful in itself as a form of price discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about market supply and demand conditions, and bargaining associations can play an important role in ensuring contract reliability. These and other benefits must be weighed against the organizational and ongoing operational costs of a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Cooperative bargaining; Imperfect competition; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18526 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails to attract non-farm or "private" investment? We hypothesize that farm capital is high cost, relative to that provided by private entrepreneurs (or in other words, that there is a degree of asset fixity in farm capital) but that it engenders greater organizational commitment-which is particularly important when expected market returns are low-on the part of producers. This commitment arises from the indirect incentive properties associated with at-risk capital. We... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate financing; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18478 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan. |
| This paper estimates an agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry. Model estimation proceeds in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed compensations with actual compensations and choose preference parameters to minimize distance between the two. Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of .08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion (where returns are measured in units of $100/ton), and find that growers' effort cost is 1.8% of total operating cost. Welfare losses from information constraints are... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20560 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods. Based on field interviews with grower members and company management, we describe changes in the economic relationship between growers and the company that resulted from the purchase. We argue that many of the observed changes are consistent with a financial-contracting view of the cooperative firm where the bundling of input-supply and board activities generates a reduction in agency rents that compensates for the organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56890 |
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| Marcoul, Philippe; Lawrence, John D.; Hueth, Brent. |
| Participants in U.S. markets for live cattle increasingly rely on federal grading standards to price slaughtered animals. This change is due to the growing prominence of "grid" pricing mechanisms that specify explicit premiums and discounts contingent on an animal's graded quality class. Although these changes alter the way cattle are priced, the technology for sorting animals into quality classes has changed very little: human graders visually inspect each slaughtered carcass and call a "quality" and "yield" grade in a matter of seconds as the carcass passes on a moving trolley. There is anecdotal evidence of systematic bias in these called grades across time and regions within U.S. markets. We examine whether such claims are supported in a sample of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21123 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan. |
| This paper uses extensive data on production outcomes for processing tomato growers in California to examine the efficacy of explicit incentives observed in grower-processor contracts. Our data include all deliveries of tomatoes to some 51 processors over a period of 7 years in which at least 65 unique types of contracts are employed. Results indicate that incentives account for a significant proportion of observed variation in production outcomes, and that complementarities across different sorts of "incentive instruments" play a prominent role in contract design. Although explicit incentives explain a substantial portion of the variation in production outcomes relative to that which could be explained by incentives (as captured by processor/year fixed... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21990 |
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| Fulton, Murray E.; Hueth, Brent. |
| The cases assembled in this special issue provide a rich setting for an examination of a number of cooperative conversion and restructurings that have occurred over the last 10 years. The cases also provide some lessons on the larger cooperative problems and questions in which cooperative researchers have been interested. The cases suggest that some of the conversions and restructurings are due to what can simply be called poor management, something that is not unique to co-ops, but is in fact common to all business enterprises regardless of their structure. At the same time, the cases also point out that common structural problems associated with cooperatives – such as lack of capital, property right problems and portfolio problems – do have an impact on... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56894 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| This papers analyzes efficient regulatory design of a polluting firm who has two kinds of private information about its production environment. First, the firm has better information than the regulator regarding technological possibilities for controlling pollution; and second, some aspects of the firm's implementation of a given technology are potentially unobservable. Design standards that specify a particular pollution abatement technology for the firm are efficient when the level of information asymmetry regarding technology choice is low, and when the cost of performance measurement is high; performance standards are efficient when the level of penalty needed to induce efficient implementation is unlikely to bankrupt the firm; and process standards... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22148 |
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| Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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