SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Experimental Economics and the Environment: Eliciting Values for Controversial Goods

Schilizzi, Steven.

By design, tenders are used when costs are unknown. But if costs are unknown, how can we evaluate the tenders, when their evaluation involves measuring their cost-effectiveness? We identify three approaches: theoretical, empirical and experimental. We first use experimental data to compare the efficiency of each approach, then apply the most efficient one to field data from the Scottish fishing vessel decommissioning program. We estimate the potential errors one would make in using a less efficient approach. In this case, we demonstrate a novel use of controlled lab experiments for interpreting field data and evaluating policy effectiveness.

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation; Experiments; Evaluation; Measurement; Market-based policy instruments; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124442

Shogren, Jason F.; Parkhurst, Gregory M.; Hudson, Darren.

We illustrate the experimental method by examining bidding behavior for controversial goods, i.e., goods in which bidders have positive and negative values. Our results suggest that bidding behavior differs across auction type. Bidders with positive induced values bid sincerely in a WTP auction. Bidders bid conservatively, however, in the WTA auction, foregoing profitable opportunities. Informing bidders of their optimal strategy serves to attenuate bidding discrepancies but does not eliminate them. Treating the WTP and WTA auctions as equivalent given positive and negative values could lead one to overstate the costs relative to the benefits of the controversial good.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Experiments; Willingness to pay; Willingness to accept; Positive and negative induced values; Crop Production/Industries; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90824

In-Store Evaluation of Consumer Willingness to Pay for “Farm-Raised” Pre-Cooked Roast Beef: A Case Study

Nalley, Lawton Lanier; Hudson, Darren; Rogers, Robert W.; Martin, James M.; Herring, Joshua L..

A choice-based conjoint experiment was used to examine consumer willingness to pay for a farm-raised pre-cooked roast beef product. Consumers were contacted in a grocery store and provided a sample of the pre-cooked product. Findings indicate there is a small, but statistically significant willingness-to-pay premium for the farm-raised product, suggesting that some product differentiation may result in higher prices for these products. The study outlines an approach to marketing research.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Beef; Conjoint; Convenience foods; Experiments; In-store tests; Surveys; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59587

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

McEvoy, David M.; Cherry, Todd L.; Stranlund, John K..

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.

Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria

Palavras-chave: Public goods; Coalition formation; Inequality aversion; Participation requirement; Experiments; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; H41.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102265

Cason, Timothy N.; Gangadharan, Lata; Duke, Charlotte.

In theory, competitive emission permit markets minimise total abatement cost for any emission ceiling. Permit markets are often imperfectly competitive, however, if they are thin and dominated by large firms. The dominant firm(s) could exercise market power and increase other firms’ costs of pollution control, while reducing their own emission control costs. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organised using the double auction trading institution. Our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the Port Phillip Watershed in Victoria, Australia. We vary across treatments the...

NATURAL HAZARDS AND RISK AVERSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA

Palavras-chave: Market Power; Emission Permits; Experiments; Environmental Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; Q25; Q28.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57841

van den Berg, Marrit; Fort, Ricardo; Burger, Kees.

We use experimental and survey data from two natural-hazard prone countries in Latin America to test the hypothesis that natural hazards affect risk aversion. We use two methods to measure risk aversion: simple questions on the willingness to pay for a hypothetical lottery and more complicated experiments involving real pay-offs. We find that whereas the experiments provide reasonable estimates of risk aversion, the hypothetical questions result in unrealistic distributions of preferences. The experimental results strongly support the hypothesis that experiencing natural shocks makes people more risk averse, not only in the short run but also in the medium and long run.

DEVELOPING A DEMAND REVEALING MARKET CRITERION FOR CONTINGENT VALUATION VALIDITY TESTS

Palavras-chave: Latin America; Nicaragua; Peru; Risk aversion; Natural hazards; Experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Risk and Uncertainty.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51394

Rondeau, Daniel; Poe, Gregory L.; Schulze, William D..

Past research suggests that contingent valuation overstates demand for public goods. These estimates of hypothetical bias are probably invalid since they rely on voluntary contributions mechanisms which fail to reveal demand. An improved mechanism is shown to reveal aggregate demand in controlled experiments. However, individual contributions deviate from induced value. Key Words: contingent valuation, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments JEL Codes: H41, C92, Q20

Exogenous Targeting Instruments under Differing Information Conditions

Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; H41; C92; Q20.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6856

Spraggon, John M..

This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with...

Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving

Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383

Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret.

Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories, we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and found no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image.

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Prosocial behavior; Experiments; Voluntary contributions; Financial Economics; Public Economics; D64; C90; L30.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121670

Unlocking water markets: an experimental approach

Cook, Joseph H.; Rabotyagov, Sergey S..

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Palavras-chave: Water market; Experiments; Resource economies; Marketing; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103940

Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel.

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are...

IS CHEAP TALK EFFECTIVE AT ELIMINATING HYPOTHETICAL BIAS IN A PROVISION

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370

Murphy, James J.; Stevens, Thomas H.; Weatherhead, Darryl.

Replaced with revised version of paper 10/06/04.

OBESITY AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation; Experiments; Hypothetical bias; Voluntary; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C9; Q26; H41.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14510

Richards, Timothy J.; Hamilton, Stephen F.; Pofahl, Geoffrey M..

Behavioral economists maintain that addictions such as alcoholism, smoking and over-eating represent examples of present-bias in decision making that is fundamentally irrational. In this article, we develop a model of present bias and apparently hyperbolic discounting that is fully consistent with rational behavior. We construct an experiment to test our hypothesis and to determine whether discount rates differ for individuals who engage in behaviors that could endanger their health. Our results show that discount functions are quasi-hyperbolic in shape, and that obesity and drinking are positively related to the discount rate. Anti-obesity policy, therefore, would be best directed to informing individuals as to the long-term implications of short-term...

Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab

Palavras-chave: Addiction; Discounting; Experiments; Hyperbolic; Obesity; Time-inconsistency; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; C91; D12; D91; I18.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116410

Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F..

The efficient auction is designed to induce truthful bidding for bidders with affiliated values. Herein we implement the auction in the lab, and observe that inexperienced people can bid systematically in this more complex environment, albeit yielding a flatter bid function than the truthful one.