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Registros recuperados: 53 | |
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Hamm, Joseph A.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; jhamm@unl.edu; PytlikZillig, Lisa M.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; lpytlikzillig2@unl.edu; Herian, Mitchel N.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; mnherian@nebraska.edu; Tomkins, Alan J.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; atomkins@unl.edu; Dietrich, Hannah; Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Center on Children, Families, and the Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; hdietrich@ccfl.unl.edu; Michaels, Sarah; Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center ; michaels2@unl.edu. |
Regulating water resources is a critically important yet increasingly complex component of the interaction between ecology and society. Many argue that effective water regulation relies heavily upon the compliance of water users. The relevant literature suggests that, rather than relying on external motivators for individual compliance, e.g., punishments and rewards, it is preferable to focus on internal motivators, including trust in others. Although prior scholarship has resulted in contemporary institutional efforts to increase public trust, these efforts are hindered by a lack of evidence regarding the specific situations in which trust, in its various forms, most effectively increases compliance. We report the results of an experiment designed to... |
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Human dimensions of natural resource management; Procedural justice; Trust; Water allocation. |
Ano: 2013 |
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Molle, Francois; Mamanpoush, Alireza; Miranzadeh, Mokhtar. |
This report provides a case study from the province of Esfahan, in central Iran, describing the struggle of a village to secure the water resources without which local agriculture, and altogether life in the village, would be impossible. It illustrates the endless ingenuity of farmers in their quest for water, how land and water rights have developed, how various legal repertoires may conflict with one another, and how the intervention of the state transformed the wider hydrological cycle of the valley and affected the delicate equilibrium between population and resources that had prevailed until then. The report estimates the costs of accessing one cubic meter from each of these different sources and shows how political interventions or drought mitigation... |
Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Water allocation; Water rights; Irrigation management; Drought; Wells; Dams; Canals; Legal aspects; Villages; Iran; Zayandeh Rud Basin; Jalalabad; Najafabad; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Consumer/Household Economics; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53063 |
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Mbatha, C. Nhlanhla; Antrobus, G.G.. |
The Physical Externality Model is used to illustrate the potential limitations of blindly adopting formal models for economic investigation and explanation in varied geographical contexts. As argued by institutional economists for the last hundred years the practice limits the value and relevance of most general economic inquiry. This model postulates that the geographical location of farmers along a given watercourse, in which water is diverted individually, leads to structural inefficiencies that negatively affect the whole farming community. These effects are felt more severely at downstream sites and lead to a status quo where upstream farmers possess relative economic and political advantages over their counterparts elsewhere. In the study of the Kat... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Institutions; Water allocation; Physical externality; Kat River Valley. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47657 |
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Registros recuperados: 53 | |
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