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Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping 31
Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino.
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370
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Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services 31
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto.
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547
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The Determinants of Suppliers’ Performance in E-Procurement: Evidence from the Italian Government’s E-Procurement Platform 31
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto; Fana, Marta.
Participation of small businesses in the market for public contracts is widely recognized as a key policy issue. It is also commonly held that the adoption of e-procurement solutions can be effective in pursuing such an objective. To this end, we analyze the transactions completed in the period 2004-2007 through the Italian Government’s e-procurement platform, that is, the marketplace managed by the Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.). Although descriptive statistics indicate that micro suppliers are the most represented group of firms in the marketplace, our econometric treatment provides some evidence that the former are less successful than all other suppliers in getting public contracts. Degree of loyalty with buyers, location and the use...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: E-Procurement; Small Suppliers; Request For Quotations; Performance; Public Contracts; Count Data; D44; H57; C16; C25; L25.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37672
Registros recuperados: 3
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