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| Arnold, Michael; Duke, Joshua M.; Messer, Kent D.. |
| This paper evaluates land preservation and conservation programs by examining the performance of a discriminative auction that is often used to select parcels in the U.S. The paper hypothesizes that the auction is unlikely to be cost effective because an information asymmetry introduces adverse selection. Experiments are used to examine the extent of adverse selection and compare it to a baseline where no programs exist. Then, we examine the ability of two mechanisms to correct the incentive problem. The results show that adverse selection is likely to exist in conservation auctions (achieving just 60.7% of total possible social efficiency in the experiments) and that a mechanism can sort types so as to improve cost effectiveness with respect to the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61516 |
