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Registros recuperados: 10
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Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas "Bubble" and Internal Burden Sharing AgEcon
Michaelowa, Axel; Betz, Regina.
Currently, the EU-15 forms the only bubble under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008-2012. Of course due to Art. 4,4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26397
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Additional Action Reserve: A proposed mechanism to facilitate additional voluntary and policy emission reductions efforts in emissions trading schemes AgEcon
Twomey, Paul; Betz, Regina; MacGill, Iain; Passey, Robert.
An additional action reserve (AAR) is proposed as a mechanism that allows government and voluntary private interests to make additional emission reductions beyond a national cap. A proportion of Australian emission units (AEUs) is set aside each year. The units can then be retired if state or local government, businesses or individuals take specific emission reduction measures that go beyond those expected from the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). AEUs allocated to the reserve that are not retired through additional activities would be made available to CPRS participants. By providing an upper bound to such actions, the scheme would limit uncertainty about how many permits are available for emitters. The scheme would also provide a limit to the...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94944
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Linking the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme AgEcon
Jotzo, Frank; Betz, Regina.
A detailed proposal for an economy-wide emissions trading scheme in Australia was tabled by the government in December 2008 with a proposed start date for mid-2010. The government proposes unilateral linking, with no initial bilateral linkages, through the clean development mechanism and joint implementation. The proposal has resulted in serious concern about significant permit price increases and price capping, leading to a ban on permit sales. This research paper evaluates the proposed Australian scheme in relation to international emissions trading and linkages. Different scenarios for the Australian permit price under unilateral linking are considered. Options for bilateral linking with the European Union and New Zealand schemes are also evaluated,...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Climate change policy; Australia; Emissions trading; International linkages; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94814
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Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia AgEcon
Betz, Regina; Seifert, Stefan; Cramton, Peter; Kerr, Suzi.
Allocating permits based on individual historical emissions (‘grandfathering’), or industry benchmark data, is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Free permit allocation has proven complex and inefficient (particularly in the European Union) with distribution implications also politically difficult to justify. For these reasons, auctioning emissions permits has become more popular than allocating permits. The European Union is now moving towards auctioning more than 50 per cent of all permits in 2013. In the US, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has started with auctioning 100 per cent of permits. The Australian proposal for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) also provides for auctioning a significant share of...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Greenhouse gases; Auctions; Emissions trading; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94878
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Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly AgEcon
Calford, Evan M.; Heinzel, Christoph; Betz, Regina.
We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long- run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Initial permit allocation; Bertrand competition; EU ETS; Endogenous technology choice; Kreps and Scheinkman; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L13; Q28; D43.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95066
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Making GHG Emissions Trading Work - Crucial Issues in Designing National and International Emissions Trading Systems AgEcon
Butzengeiger, Sonja; Betz, Regina; Bode, Sven.
Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol defines International Emissions Trading exclusively on country level, sub-national entities like industrial installations or households are not included initially. However, there are some arguments for such an expansion, of which the most important ones are a significant increase of the overall efficiency of the trading system as well as an increase of market liquidity. In the first part of this paper, the options for an inclusion of sub-national entities are analysed, concluding that AAUs should not be allocated to participants directly. Instead, there are several options how those entities can be included in International Emissions Trading as defined in the Kyoto-Protocol in an indirect way. The second part of the paper...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26153
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In or Out: Efficient inclusion of installations in an Emissions Trading Scheme? AgEcon
Betz, Regina; Sanderson, Todd; Ancev, Tihomir.
Regulators around the world are currently considering national emissions trading systems (ETS) as a cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ETS installations coverage is one of the numerous design issues confronting them. ‘Blanket coverage’ that includes all an economy’s industrial emitters of greenhouse gases has some intuitive appeal. Although it seems equitable it does not, however, take into full account all the costs related to the extent of coverage. This report shows how an alternative approach of ‘efficient coverage’ can achieve the same emission reduction outcome at lower social cost. The approach is based on maximising the benefits of including installations in an ETS, while at the same time taking into account all relevant...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Emissions Trading Scheme; Environmental Policy; Installation Coverage; Transaction costs.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q50; Q58; H23.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94877
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Optimal Coverage of Installations in a Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) AgEcon
Sanderson, Todd; Ancev, Tihomir; Betz, Regina.
Trading schemes for emission allowances have become a panacea for nations aspiring to reduce their aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases from industry in a cost-effective manner. The contention of this paper is that an emissions trading scheme (ETS) should not be based on blanket coverage of installations on a downstream level, but should rather be designed to include some installations, and from some industrial sectors. In the case of an ETS there are high costs of administration, monitoring and transacting imposed on the installations covered. These costs are supposed to be more than offset by the cost savings realised through trading in the market for emission allowances. However, the paper shows that not all installations can fully offset...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Climate Change; Emissions Trading Scheme; European Union; Marginal Abatement Costs; Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6047
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A Theoretical Model of Optimal Compliance Decisions under Different Penalty Designs in Emissions Trading Markets AgEcon
Restiani, Phillia; Betz, Regina.
This paper employs a theoretical model to examine compliance incentives and market efficiency under three penalty types: the fixed penalty rate, which uses a constant marginal financial penalty; the make-good provision (quantity penalty), where each missing permit in the current period is to be offset with a ratio (restoration rate) in the following period; and a mixed penalty, which combines the two penalty types. Using a simple two-period model of firm's profit maximisation, we analyse compliance decisions and the efficient penalty level under each penalty type. Firms‟ compliance strategies are modelled as an irreversible investment in abatement measures and permit buying in the market. Our findings indicate that the penalty type does not affect...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Penalty design; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107585
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The Effects of Penalty Design on Market Performance: Experimental Evidence from an Emissions Trading Scheme with Auctioned Permits AgEcon
Restiani, Phillia; Betz, Regina.
This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory permit market with auctioning, including the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposed design of tying the penalty rate to the auction price. Compliance strategies are limited to undertaking irreversible abatement investment decisions or buying permits. We aim to assess how penalty design under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences might affect compliance incentives, permit price discovery, and efficiency. In contrast to theory, we find that penalty levels serve as a focal point that indicates compliance costs and affects compliance strategies....
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Penalty design; Experiment; Auction; Irreversible investment; Abatement; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107586
Registros recuperados: 10
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