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| Beckmann, Volker; Boger, Silke. |
| The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish hog farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% of them reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believe the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as "enforceable" and "not-enforceable" and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responds can be... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural contracts; Contract enforcement; Courts; Transition; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25878 |
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| Hanisch, Markus; Beckmann, Volker; Boger, Silke; Brem, Markus. |
| Studies of the transition process remind us of Stiglitz's comparison between pathology and the economic analysis of institutions (1989): asking what went wrong and what did not is the essence of understanding the functioning of social systems. Thus, carefully conducted empirical studies of the transition process itself may yield elucidative results applicable not only to theory but also to institutional policy changes in transition. This paper presents the key findings of KATO, a comprehensive research project focussing on the transition process of agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe. From 1997 to 2000, the project empirically examined processes of liberalization and market development, privatization and property rights changes, as well as... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24800 |
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| Beckmann, Volker; Boger, Silke. |
| The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement that captures the boundary between contracts to be judged as court "enforceable" and "not-enforceable" and, simultaneously, identifies the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis based on a survey of 306 Polish hog farmer conducted in 1999 strongly supports our model. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22213 |
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