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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Boom, Jan Tjeerd (3) Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Credit trading (2) Emissions trading (2) Environmental policy (2) International trade (2) L51 (2) Q25 (2) Q28 (2) Strategic behavior (2) F10 (1) F12 (1) Imperfect competition (1) Perfect competition (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2004 (1) 2003 (2) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Strategic Choice of Domestic Environmental Policy Instrument and International Emissions Trading Scheme in an Open Economy with Imperfect Competition AgEcon Boom, Jan Tjeerd. This paper presents a model of imperfect international competition. Within this framework, the optimal choice of national environmental policy instrument and international emissions trading scheme is discussed. The choice of national instrument is restricted to absolute and relative standards, which form the basis for permit and credit trading respectively. It is shown that relatives standards and credit trading lead to higher output than emission ceilings and permit trading. I find that governments want to increase production beyond the level reached with emission ceilings and therefore prefer relative standards. Furthermore, international emissions trading is only optimal when the country imports emission quotas, and in several cases, governments will... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental policy; Emissions trading; Credit trading; International trade; Imperfect competition; Strategic behavior; Environmental Economics and Policy; F12; L51; Q25; Q28. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24177 Strategic Choice of International Emissions Trading Scheme in an Open Economy with Perfect Competition AgEcon Boom, Jan Tjeerd. Emissions trading can be organized in several ways. In particular, private emissions trading can be organized as permit trading, or as credit trading. The schemes have a different impact on output with credit trading leading to a higher output level than permit trading. This paper analyzes what the optimal choice of emissions trading scheme is in a model with international trade and perfect competition in the product and emission quota market. Furthermore, I discuss whether it is optimal for the country to allow its firms to trade emissions internationally. The paper shows that countries want to use these schemes in different circumstances, depending on whether they import or export the good. Furthermore, it is shown that in several cases, countries... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental policy; Emissions trading; Credit trading; International trade; Perfect competition; Strategic behavior; Environmental Economics and Policy; F10; L51; Q25; Q28. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24196 Permit Trading and Credit Trading - A Comparative Static Analysis with Perfect and Imperfect Competition AgEcon Boom, Jan Tjeerd. This paper compares emissions trading based on an absolute cap, denoted permit trading, with a scheme based on relative standards, denoted credit trading, under both perfect and imperfect competition. I show that credit trading is an inefficient instrument and that the two schemes have a different impact on the regulated industry. Credit trading leads to higher total output, higher marginal abatement costs and a higher number of firms in the market than permit trading. Furthermore, under both schemes the total number of firms can both decrease and increase as a result of regulation. I find that under perfect competition, permit trading gives highest welfare, while under imperfect competition, credit trading mostly leads to higher welfare. With foreign... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24214 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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