Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Chong, Alberto E. (3) Bejarano, Hernan D. (1) De La O, Ana (1) Fleming, David A. (1) Galdo, Virgilio (1) Karlan, Dean S. (1) Torero, Maximo (1) Wantchekon, Leonard (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Accountability (1) C93 (1) Community/Rural/Urban Development (1) Consumer/Household Economics (1) Corruption (1) D72 (1) D73 (1) D82 (1) D83 (1) Elections (1) G32 (1) H10 (1) Information (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Institutions (1) International Development (1) J45 (1) Natural disasters (1) O1 (1) O13 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2011 (1) 2006 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes AgEcon Chong, Alberto E.; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; Wantchekon, Leonard. Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640 Does Privatization Deliver? Access to Telephone Services and Household Income in Poor Rural Areas Using a Quasi-Natural Experiment for Peru AgEcon Chong, Alberto E.; Galdo, Virgilio; Torero, Maximo. We take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Peru by which the privatized telecommunications company was required by government to randomly install and operate public pay phones on small rural towns along the national territory. Using a especially designed household survey for a representative sample of rural towns we are able to link access to telephone services with household income. We find, that regardless of the income measurement, most characteristics of public telephone are positively linked with income. Remarkably, the benefits are given at both non-farm and farm income levels. Not only do the findings hold when using instrumental variables but they are further confirmed when using propensity scores matching methods. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Privatization; Institutions; Rural; Poverty; Telecommunications; Consumer/Household Economics; G32; H10; J45; O1. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25691 Do Natural Disasters Affect Trust/Trustworthiness? Evidence from the 2010 Chilean Earthquake AgEcon Fleming, David A.; Chong, Alberto E.; Bejarano, Hernan D.. A series of trust games were conducted in Chile to analyze whether the past 2010 earthquake affected trust and trustworthiness in rural communities. Results show that trust levels are invariant between villages affected by the earthquake and villages not affected by this shock (control group). However, we find statistical evidence that trustworthiness has diminished in areas affected by the earthquake. Results are relevant for policy regarding aid and recovery of communities affected by these types of disasters. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Trust games; Natural disasters; Trustworthiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; International Development; C93; O13. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104522 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco