Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
DEPOSIT-REFUND SYSTEMS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR THE REDUCTION AND PROPER DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AgEcon
Chu, Mei-Chin.
Hazardous wastes such as spent solvents and heavy-metal paint waste are characterized by certain adverse properties which include toxicity, reactivity, corrosivity, and flammability. Improper disposal of hazardous wastes may lead to air pollution, water pollution, or soil contamination which are dangerous for human health and for the ecosystem. These effects are known as externalities if the consequences, or costs, are not considered in the waste-generators' decisions. Due to externality, the social costs, including externality costs, and private costs diverge. Since the Love Canal event, hazardous waste disposal (HWD) has drawn national attention. A Roper poll reported that hazardous waste was perceived by the American public as the most important...
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1994 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11004
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CONTRACTS TO REDUCE NITRATE LEACHING: A WHOLE-FARM ANALYSIS AgEcon
Chu, Mei-Chin; Swinton, Scott M.; Batie, Sandra S.; Dobbins, Craig L..
Ten alternative seed corn contract specifications are evaluated with respect to nitrate leaching and profitability for the processor firm (principal) and contracted grower (agent). A whole-farm optimization and feasibility analysis suggest that contract terms can be used to reduce non-point source pollution.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11806
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND EXCESSIVE NITROGEN USE IN AGRICULTURE AgEcon
Preckel, Paul V.; Shively, Gerald E.; Baker, Timothy G.; Chu, Mei-Chin; Burrell, Jessica Eide.
This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30902
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
A RISK PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO DESIGNING CONTRACTS TO REDUCE NITRATE LEACHING AgEcon
Chu, Mei-Chin; Swinton, Scott M.; Batie, Sandra S..
As contractual agriculture expands, contract design offers a non-regulatory opportunity to reduce non-point source pollution. A risk programming analysis of seed corn contract designs illustrates a tractable empirical principal-agent model, and shows that grower risk preferences affect contract acceptability and efficiency at reducing nitrate leaching.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11594
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional