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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Cross, Mike H. (3) Rejesus, Roderick M. (3) Little, Bertis B. (2) Lovell, Ashley C. (2) Escalante, Cesar L. (1) Shucking, Michael (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Abuse (1) Collusion (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) Crop insurance (1) Empirical analysis (1) Fraud (1) G22 (1) Q12 (1) Q18 (1) Q19 (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Waste (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Journal Article (2) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2004 (1) 2003 (2) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Determinants of Anomalous Prevented Planting Claims: Theory and Evidence from Crop Insurance AgEcon Rejesus, Roderick M.; Lovell, Ashley C.; Little, Bertis B.; Cross, Mike H.. This study examines the factors that determine the likelihood of submitting a potentially fraudulent prevented planting claim. A theoretical model is developed and the theoretical predictions are empirically verified by utilizing a binary choice model and crop insurance data from the southern United States. The empirical results show that insured producers with higher prevented planting coverage, lower dollar value of expected yield, and a history of submitting prevented planting claims are more likely to submit an anomalous prevented planting claim. The empirical model also suggests revenue insurance plans may be more vulnerable to prevented planting fraud than the traditional yield-based insurance plan. Results of this study can be valuable to compliance... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31632 OPPORTUNITY COSTS, SHARE LEASING, AND PREVENTED PLANTING CLAIMS IN CROP INSURANCE AgEcon Rejesus, Roderick M.; Escalante, Cesar L.; Cross, Mike H.. This paper determines whether the opportunity costs of share leasing and the share amounts of farmers/tenants affect the likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim. Results from our probit analysis shows that lower opportunity costs of share leasing and higher farmer/tenant share amount can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting. These results have potential implications for setting prevented planting buy-up rates and crop insurance compliance procedures. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/35017 Patterns of Collusion in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program: An Empirical Analysis AgEcon Rejesus, Roderick M.; Little, Bertis B.; Lovell, Ashley C.; Cross, Mike H.; Shucking, Michael. This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log-linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Abuse; Collusion; Crop insurance; Empirical analysis; Fraud; Waste; G22; Q12; Q18; Q19. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43393 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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