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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor D'Alpaos, Chiara (3) Moretto, Michele (2) Valbonesi, Paola (2) Vergalli, Sergio (1) Zanatta, Valentina (1) Palavra-chave D81 (2) H57 (2) L33 (2) Community/Rural/Urban Development (1) Contract Incompleteness (1) Enforceability of Rules (1) Financial Economics (1) Investment Timing Flexibility (1) Investment timing flexibility (1) Penalty Fee (1) Premium/penalty fee (1) Procurement/concession contracts (1) Public Economics (1) Public Procurement Contracts (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2009 (1) 2006 (1) 2003 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Time is Money: Optimal Investment Delay in Procurement (and Concession) Contracts AgEcon D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola. Procurement (and concession) contracts are agreements granting the right to construct public works, operate and provide a service/good. The main advantage of a procurement contract is that it passes full responsibility for investment and operations to the private sector and consequently provides incentives for efficiency. Although most contracts include penalty/premium clauses to avoid construction risks (i.e. delays), evidence from ongoing procurement contracts shows that there are many delays in making investments. Actually these clauses introduce the flexibility to decide when it is optimal to invest and consequently increase the contract’s value for the contractor. Therefore if the contracting authority underestimates penalty/premium fees, these may be... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Procurement/concession contracts; Premium/penalty fee; Investment timing flexibility; Public Economics; L33; H57; D81. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6642 PRIVATE USES VERSUS PUBLIC INTERESTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF VENETIAN VILLAS: A MULTICRITERIA APPROACH AgEcon Zanatta, Valentina; D'Alpaos, Chiara. Venetian villas, which make up one of the most typical systems of historical architectural goods in the Northern Italian countryside, are a clear example of the allocation problems of merit goods management. These problems derive from the differences between the limited financial resources available and both the actual distribution of the benefits received by the public at large and the preferences expressed by the majority. In fact, the Venetian villas are risking progressive degradation from abandonment or invasive transformations due to unsuitable management politics and scarce financial resources. For this reason, the management policies regarding these merit goods must be reexamined both theoretically and in practice. Furthermore, the legal... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14415 "It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts AgEcon D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; Vergalli, Sergio. We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public Procurement Contracts; Penalty Fee; Investment Timing Flexibility; Contract Incompleteness; Enforceability of Rules; Financial Economics; L33; H57; D81. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54351 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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