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| Russo, Carlo; Perito, Maria Angela; Di Fonzo, Antonella. |
| Large retail chains have spent considerable resources to promote production protocols and traceability across the supply chain, aiming at increasing food safety. Yet, the majority of consumers are unaware of these private food safety standards (PFSS) and retailers are not informing them. This behavior denotes a pooling paradox: supermarkets spend a large amount of money for food safety and yet they forget to inform consumers. The result is a pooling equilibrium where consumers cannot discriminate among high quality and low quality products and supermarkets give up the potential price premium. This paper provides an economic explanation for the paradox using a contract-theory model. We found that PFSS implementation may be rational even if consumers have no... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115987 |
