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| Adamowicz, Wiktor L.; Arnot, C.; Boxall, Peter C.; Dridi, Chokri; Goddard, Ellen W.; Jordan, M.; Forbes, K.; Laate, K.; Myshaniuk, K.; Parlee, B.; Petigara, M.; Unterschultz, James R.; Zimmer, N.. |
| This report summarizes a series of projects undertaken by staff and students in the Department of Rural Economy which examine various socio-economic aspects of chronic wasting disease and its effect on a range of stakeholders in Alberta. The four projects included exploring impacts on the cervid farming industry, hunters, the general Albertan public, and certain Aboriginal groups. General results from these studies are presented with references that provide a more thorough analysis and discussion. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Chronic wasting disease; Socio-economic impacts; Aboriginals; Farming industry; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; Q12; Q26; Q28. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98686 |
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| Dridi, Chokri; Khanna, Madhu. |
| We analyze the design of water pricing rules emerging from farmers' lobbying and their implications for the size of the lobby, water use, profits and social welfare. The lobbying groups are the adopters of modern irrigation technology and the non-adopters. The pricing rules are designed to meet budget balance of water provision; we considered (i) a two-part tariff composed of a mandatory per-acre fee plus a volumetric charge and (ii) a nonlinear pricing schedule. Our results show that under either pricing schemes, farmers can organize and affect the outcome of the water schedule design. When only a volumetric fee is levied, the budget balance constraint prevents lobbies from influencing the design of the pricing scheme. In terms of expected welfare, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
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| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19348 |
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| Dridi, Chokri; Khanna, Madhu. |
| The purpose of this paper is to develop a water allocation and technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine that recognizes informational asymmetry among water users and between water users and water authorities. We consider informational asymmetry about the agent's type, defined by a mix of land quality and knowledge. Adverse selection is found to significantly reduce the adoption of modern irrigation technology and to lead to less retirement of poor quality lands than under full information. Further investigation shows that even with asymmetric information, incentives for water trades can exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties. Our results suggest that under asymmetric information, even a thin... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22140 |
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