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| Dubois, Pierre; Ligon, Ethan. |
| Using data on individual consumption expenditures from a sample of farm households in the Philippines, we construct a direct test of the risk-sharing implications of the collective household model. We are able to contrast the efficient outcomes predicted by the collective household model with the outcomes we might expect in environments in which food consumption delivers not only utils, but also nutrients which affect future productivity. Finally, we are able to contrast each of these two models with a third, involving a hidden action problem within the household; in this case, the efficient provision of incentives implies that the consumption of each household member depends on their (stochastic) productivity. The efficiency conditions which... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120421 |
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| Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. |
| The production contracts between integrator firms (principals) and independent growers (agents) in most agricultural settings are governed by short term contracts. Recently, some firms converted their short-term into long-term contracts. This change in contract duration represents a natural experiment that enables us to isolate the effect of the change in contract length from other changes in contract parameters on agents' incentives to perform. Using contract settlement data for the production of hatching eggs we show that switching from a short-term to a long-term contract alleviated the hold-up problem and resulted in increased investments in productivity enhancing technologies and practices which improved performance across all productivity margins. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50046 |
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| Dubois, Pierre; Nauges, Celine. |
| We propose a structural empirical approach à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to disentangle the effect of experts’ grades from the effect of unobserved quality on the pricing of experience goods. Using a panel data set of 108 châteaux selling wine on the Bordeaux ‘en primeur’ market, we provide some empirical validation for the theoretical result that the price set by wine producers is used as a signal for wine quality. We confirm that experts’ grades affect producers’ choice of ‘en primeur’ price above the effect of unobserved wine quality. Our empirical results also show that failing to control for endogeneity caused by the omission of unobserved leads to over-estimate the influence of experts’ grades on the ‘en primeur’ price. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Quality signaling; Wine price; Wine market; Expert ratings; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37320 |
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| Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. |
| The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568 |
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