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Efficiency of alternative property right allocations when farmers produce multiple environmental goods under the condition of economies of scope AgEcon
Strappazzon, Loris; Ha, Arthur; Eigenraam, Mark; Duke, Charlotte; Stoneham, Gary.
The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency – acting on behalf of the community – employs an auction‐based mechanism to buy biodiversity services from farmers. However, farmers’ production of biodiversity produces a second good as a by‐product (e.g., mitigation of a river pollutant) that is valued by point‐source emitters who are engaged in a pollution trading market. The efficiency implications of allocating the property right of the good, mitigation, to either the agency or farmers are analysed. If the agency owns the mitigation then the agency can sell mitigation to point‐source emitters,...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116171
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Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria AgEcon
Cason, Timothy N.; Gangadharan, Lata; Duke, Charlotte.
In theory, competitive emission permit markets minimise total abatement cost for any emission ceiling. Permit markets are often imperfectly competitive, however, if they are thin and dominated by large firms. The dominant firm(s) could exercise market power and increase other firms’ costs of pollution control, while reducing their own emission control costs. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organised using the double auction trading institution. Our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the Port Phillip Watershed in Victoria, Australia. We vary across treatments the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Market Power; Emission Permits; Experiments; Environmental Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57841
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Experimental Economics and Water Policy AgEcon
Duke, Charlotte.
Experiments in economics and their application to policy design continue to gain increasing popular appeal. Australia is investing in training, capacity building and international partnerships to bring these skills to our policy makers. Economic experiments are used to test policy-related hypotheses: to examine the behavioural processes upon which the policy is built, identify policy bugs, confirm incentive mechanism performance, investigate new decision processes, and illustrate economic allocation systems to stakeholders. Experiments provide a new source of information to improve policy design. This paper explores a set of experiments conducted for the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality Market Based Instruments Pilots Program. The...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Policy Experiments; Market mechanisms for the environment; Water; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q25; Q28; C90.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25369
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Book reviews AgEcon
Ha, Arthur; Dyack, Brenda; Stoneham, Gary; Farquharson, Robert J.; Scarborough, Helen; Duke, Charlotte; Wheeler, Sarah Ann; Saunders, Caroline M.; Nicholls, Neville; Essex, Christopher; McKitrick, Ross.
Tipo: Article Palavras-chave: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118506
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