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The Role of R&D and Technology Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives Using the Witch Model AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Duval, Romain; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo.
This paper uses the WITCH model, a computable general equilibrium model with endogenous technological change, to explore the impact of various climate policies on energy technology choices and the costs of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations. Current and future expected carbon prices appear to have powerful effects on R&D spending and clean technology diffusion. Their impact on stabilisation costs depends on the nature of R&D: R&D targeted at incremental energy efficiency improvements has only limited effects, but R&D focused on the emergence of major new low-carbon technologies could lower costs drastically if successful – especially in the non-electricity sector, where such low-carbon options are scarce today. With emissions coming...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Energy R&D; Fund; Stabilisation costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; H0; H2; H3; H4; O3; Q32; Q43; Q54.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50363
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The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Duval, Romain; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo.
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54281
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What Should We Expect from Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-Related R&D AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Duval, Romain; Tavoni, Massimo.
This paper addresses two basic issues related to technological innovation and climate stabilisation objectives: i) Can innovation policies be effective in stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations? ii) To what extent can innovation policies complement carbon pricing (taxes or permit trading) and improve the economic efficiency of a mitigation policy package? To answer these questions, we use an integrated assessment model with multiple externalities and an endogenous representation of technical progress in the energy sector. We evaluate a range of innovation policies, both as a stand-alone instrument and in combination with other mitigation policies. Even under fairly optimistic assumptions about the funding available for, and the returns to R&D, our...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Change; Environmental Policy; Energy R&D Fund; Stabilisation Costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; H0; H2; H3; H4; O3; Q32; Q43; Q54.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60745
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