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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Fan, Maoyong (3) Lee, Myoungki (2) Wu, Steven Y. (2) Jin, Yanhong H. (1) Palavra-chave CHILDHOOD OBESITY (1) Contract law (1) Contract regulation (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) Damages (1) Farm Management (1) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (1) Health Economics and Policy (1) I18 I38 R53 (1) Incentives (1) MATCHING (1) NEIGHBORHOOD AMENITY (1) PARK/PLAYGROUND (1) Principal-agent (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Journal Article (1) Presentation (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2008 (1) 2004 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última DO NEIGHBORHOOD PARKS AND PLAYGROUNDS REDUCE CHILDHOOD OBESITY? AgEcon Fan, Maoyong; Jin, Yanhong H.. Promoting physical activity in children is an important front battling Childhood obesity. This paper investigates if and by how much neighborhood parks and playgrounds, one of the most important activity-enhancing neighborhood facilities, affect childhood obesity. We employ a covariate matching technique to analyze the 2007 National Survey of Children Health data. We find that neighborhood parks and playgrounds make children more fit. The reduction in body mass index (BMI) as well as the overweight or obesity risk is both statistically and economically significant. We also find that the park impact depends on gender, age, race, income, neighborhood safety, and other neighborhood amenities. The results suggest that a provision of neighborhood parks and... Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: CHILDHOOD OBESITY; NEIGHBORHOOD AMENITY; PARK/PLAYGROUND; MATCHING; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Health Economics and Policy; I18 I38 R53. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123421 Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages AgEcon Lee, Myoungki; Wu, Steven Y.; Fan, Maoyong. This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Contract law; Contract regulation; Damages; Incentives; Principal-agent; Farm Management. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42461 Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages AgEcon Fan, Maoyong; Lee, Myoungki; Wu, Steven Y.. Using a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20392 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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