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Registros recuperados: 11
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REGULATING IRRIGATION VIA BLOCK-RATE PRICING: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AgEcon
Bar-Shira, Ziv; Finkelshtain, Israel; Simhon, Avi.
In this paper, we adapt Burtless and Hausman’'s (1978) methodology in order to estimate farmer's’ demand for irrigation water under increasing block-rate tariffs and empirically assess its effect on aggregate demand and inter-farm allocation efficiency. This methodology overcomes the technical challenges raised by increasing block rate pricing and accounts for both observed and unobserved technological heterogeneity among farmers. Employing a micro panel data documenting irrigation levels and prices in 185 Israeli agricultural communities in the period 1992-1997 we estimate water demand elasticity at -–0.3 in the short run (the effect of a price change on demand within a year of implementation) and –-0.46 in the long run. We also find that, in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Block-Rate Pricing; Irrigation; C13; Q15; Q28; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14982
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Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk AgEcon
Bar-Shira, Ziv; Finkelshtain, Israel; Simhon, Avi.
This paper studies the effect of output-price uncertainty in an industry comprised of labor-managed firms (LMFs) in which the number of LMFs and their membership are determined endogenously. The exit condition for a risk-averse LMF member is formulated and the effect of various economic variables on the equilibrium quantities and prices are examined. We find that the equilibrium in our setting is similar to the one that emerges in a ‘capitalistic’ economy where firms are owned by profit-maximizing agents. However, the effects of increases in risk and risk aversion differ from those found in a short-run analysis of a single LMF.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Labor Managed Firms; Cooperatives; Price Risk; Risk Aversion; Long-Run.; Agribusiness.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44675
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THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: LESSONS FROM REFORMS IN ISRAEL AgEcon
Finkelshtain, Israel; Kachel, Yael.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7176
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ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE NIMBY CONFLICT AgEcon
Feinerman, Eli; Finkelshtain, Israel; Kan, Iddo.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political Economy.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15000
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An Optimal Size for Rural Tourism Villages with Agglomeration and Club-Good Effects AgEcon
Tchetchik, Anat; Fleischer, Aliza; Finkelshtain, Israel.
Helping to sustain a viable rural sector, rural tourism enjoys public support in many countries. We claim that due to club-good and agglomeration externalities in the rural accommodation market, public support should be integrated in a broader local development policy that regulates the number of accommodation units in a locality. To demonstrate this we extended an equilibrium model that accounts for product differentiation and oligopolistic competition to address club-good and agglomeration effects and applied it to data collected in north Israel. We show that under the prevailing regulation, the number of units is by far higher than the social optimum.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; International Development; Political Economy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93135
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DIFFERENTIATION AND SYNERGIES IN RURAL TOURISM: EVIDENCE FROM ISRAEL AgEcon
Tchetchik, Anat; Fleischer, Aliza; Finkelshtain, Israel.
This paper applies a discrete-choice framework with product differentiation to model the rural tourism industry in Israel and to jointly estimate the effect of lodging and farm characteristics on consumer preferences and firms' costs. The model accounts for heterogeneity in tastes and technologies and allows for unobservable product characteristics. We find evidence for technological synergy in joint production of farming and rural hospitality, but none in the demand. The differentiation in the industry is vast and is the major contributor to the price-cost margin, which averages 62%. An additional minor cause are government regulations, which restrict supply. Simulation results demonstrate the growth potential of the industry and show that the government...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Rural tourism; Differentiated goods; Oligopoly markup; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Q10; L11; L83.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7178
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RURAL TOURISM: DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC INTERVENTION AND LESSONS FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE AgEcon
Tchetchik, Anat; Fleischer, Aliza; Finkelshtain, Israel.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7148
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Are Two Economic Instruments Better Than One? Combining Taxes and Quotas under Political Lobbying AgEcon
Finkelshtain, Israel; Kan, Iddo; Kislev, Yoav.
Direct commands, market based, or combined, whichever is the government's mean of intervention, is expected to raise political lobbying and pressure. This study offers a political-economic model of an industry, which is regulated by an integrated system of both direct and market based policies. The model is used for a normative theoretical analysis and as a basis for a structural econometric framework. Exploiting a unique data set that describes the regulations of irrigation water in Israel during the mid eighties by means of quotas and prices, the political and technological parameters of the model are structurally estimated and used to assess the relative efficiency of quotas, prices and integrated regulation regimes.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political Economy; Natural Resources; Water; Political Economy; D72.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93133
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AJAE Appendix: Differentiation and Synergies in Rural Tourism: Estimation and Simulation of the Israeli Market AgEcon
Tchetchik, Anat; Fleischer, Aliza; Finkelshtain, Israel.
The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7092
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THE LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY OF BLOCK-RATE PRICING AgEcon
Ziv, Bar-Shira; Finkelshtain, Israel.
It is widely believed that block-rate pricing separates income redistribution from efficiency consideration. We show that social optimum can not be implementable by block-rate pricing. Particularly, block-rate pricing with marginal cost as the highest block induces over production and utilization of resources, too-small firm size, and welfare losses.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20948
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The Economics of Collective Brands AgEcon
Fishman, Arthur; Finkelshtain, Israel; Simhon, Avi; Yacouel, Nira.
We consider the consequences of a shared brand name such as geographical names used to identify high quality products, for the incentives of otherwise autonomous firms to invest in quality. We contend that such collective brand labels improve communication between sellers and consumers, when the scale of production is too small for individual firms to establish reputations on a stand alone basis. This has two opposing effects on member firms’ incentives to invest in quality. On the one hand, it increases investment incentives by increasing the visibility and transparency of individual member firms, which increases the return from investment in quality. On the other hand, it creates an incentive to free ride on the group’s reputation, which can lead to less...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46056
Registros recuperados: 11
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