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| Fowlie, Meredith; Perloff, Jeffrey M.. |
| According to the Coase theorem, if property rights to pollute are clearly established and emissions markets nearly eliminate transaction costs, the market equilibrium will be independent of how the permits are initially allocated across firms. Using panel data from Southern California's RECLAIM program, we find that initial allocations are a statistically significant determinant of firm-level emissions. This relationship between allocation and emissions is stronger among firms with relatively high transaction costs. Thus, care must be exercised in the initial allocation of permits to ensure efficiency. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Transaction costs; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25116 |
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| Fowlie, Meredith. |
| The NOx State Implementation Plan Call was designed to facilitate cost effective reductions of nitrogen oxides emissions from large stationary sources (primarily electricity generators) through the introduction of an emissions trading program. I investigate the relationship between economic regulation and firms' long-run response to the incentives created by this emissions trading program. I estimate a discrete choice model of the firm's compliance decision, controlling for unit-level variation in compliance costs and using exogenous variation in state-level electricity industry restructuring activity to identify an e¤ect of electricity market regulation on generators' environmental compliance strategy choices. I present evidence that differences in... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19265 |
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