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| Buonanno, Paolo; Galizzi, Matteo M.. |
| We explore the relationship between litigation rates and the number of lawyers, in a typical supplier-induced demand (SID) frame. Drawing on an original panel dataset for the 169 Italian courts of justice between 2000 and 2007, we first document that the number of lawyers is positively correlated with different measures of litigation rate. Then, using an instrumental variables strategy we find that a 10 percent increase of lawyers over population is associated with an increase between 1.6 to 6 percent in civil litigation rates. Thus, our empirical analysis supports the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers: following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit their informational advantage to induce clients to access to courts even when... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Lawyers; Litigiosity; Causality; Labor and Human Capital; F22; J15; K42; R10. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90903 |
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| Bernasconi, Michele; Galizzi, Matteo M.. |
| We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat the one-way and the two-ways flow models, each for high and low link costs. The models show both multiple equilibria and coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for subjects to achieve, even in the mono-directional model where the Strict Nash equilibria is a wheel. We find that salience significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to play the networking game.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12159 |
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