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Registros recuperados: 5
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Finding Missing Markets (and a disturbing epilogue): Evidence from an Export Crop Adoption and Marketing Intervention in Kenya AgEcon
Ashraf, Nava; Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S..
In much of the developing world, many farmers grow crops for local or personal consumption despite export options which appear to be more profitable. Thus many conjecture that one or several markets are missing. We report here on a randomized controlled trial conducted by DrumNet in Kenya that attempts to help farmers adopt and market export crops. DrumNet provides smallholder farmers with information about how to switch to export crops, makes in-kind loans for the purchase of the agricultural inputs, and provides marketing services by facilitating the transaction with exporters. The experimental evaluation design randomly assigns pre-existing farmer self-help groups to one of three groups: (1) a treatment group that receives all DrumNet services, (2) a...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Field Experiment; Export Crop; Food Safety Standards; Agricultural and Food Policy; O12; Q17; F13.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46516
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Microfinance Games AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Jakiela, Pamela; Karlan, Dean S.; Morduch, Jonathan.
Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. From a theoretical perspective, however, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. We created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted eleven different games that allow us to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. We find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28520
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Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S..
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Microenterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50951
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Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S..
Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other’s loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor’s access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28413
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Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean.
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Micro-enterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/229136
Registros recuperados: 5
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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